For Recognition of a Peoples’ Right to U.N. Authorized Armed Intervention to Stop Mass Atrocities by Bitensky, Susan H.
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 16 Issue 2 
2017 
For Recognition of a Peoples’ Right to U.N. Authorized Armed 
Intervention to Stop Mass Atrocities 
Susan H. Bitensky 
Michigan State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons, International 
Law Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Susan H. Bitensky, For Recognition of a Peoples’ Right to U.N. Authorized Armed Intervention to Stop 
Mass Atrocities, 16 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 245 (2017), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
245 
Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 
 
VOLUME 16 NUMBER 2 2017 
 
FOR RECOGNITION OF A PEOPLES’ RIGHT TO 
U.N. AUTHORIZED ARMED INTERVENTION TO 
STOP MASS ATROCITIES 
SUSAN H. BITENSKY* 
This Article calls for recognition under international law of a 
conditional peoples’ right to United Nations (U.N.) authorized armed 
intervention to stop mass atrocities. The condition is that non-violent 
strategies must have failed or must reasonably be expected to fail in 
achieving this goal. 
If recognized, the new right will for the first time place power to obtain 
armed intervention in the people who are most at risk and impose a 
correlative duty on the U.N. to provide that intervention in qualifying 
cases. The right will concomitantly lift people out of the passivity of 
victimhood and make them active agents of their own deliverance—an 
amelioration consistent with and furthering human dignity. 
Juridically, the new right stands on remarkably strong ground. This 
Article relies on standard legal reasoning to discern compelling bases for 
the right within no less than three different categories of international law, 
i.e., human rights law, jus in bello, and jus ad bellum.  
To give the new right optimal leverage, this Article also urges certain 
structural reforms in the U.N. system. These include the addition of 
thematic mandates dedicated to stopping mass atrocities and the creation 
of another U.N. court, this one limited exclusively to reviewing and 
countermanding, where appropriate, Security Council deadlocks over or 
rejections of armed interventions thwarting mass atrocities. 
 
 
 * Alan S. Zekelman Professor of International Human Rights Law and Director of the Lori E. 
Talsky Center for Human Rights of Women and Children, Michigan State University College of Law. 
B.A. 1971, Case Western Reserve University; J.D. 1974, University of Chicago Law School. This one 
is for Lee. I would like to thank Professors Aidan Hehir and Ibrahim J. Gassama, as well as Michelle 
Oliel for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Any errors are entirely of my own making.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is the victims who obviously stand to benefit the most from a U.N. 
authorized armed intervention to stop mass atrocities. Yet, in the scholarly 
literature there is barely a whisper about empowering those in harm’s way 
to demand and obtain such deliverance.1 
 
 
 1. Obviously, it is impossible to cite nonexistent sources. I can only attest that I have scoured 
the scholarly literature without finding sources unambiguously and wholly embracing a peoples’ right 
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History has repeatedly shown that international law has been, in the 
main, inadequate in assuring deliverance when military clout is needed.2 
The time is long past due, and unconscionably so, for international 
lawmakers to rectify the governing legal regime. The thesis of this Article 
is that a major step in the right direction would be recognition of a 
conditional peoples’ right to armed intervention conducted or authorized 
by the United Nations (both types called “U.N. armed intervention”) for 
the purpose of halting ongoing or imminent mass atrocities. 
It bears emphasizing that the focus here is confined to armed 
interventions. Though there is no single accepted definition of “armed 
humanitarian intervention,” this is not the problem it might seem.3 The 
many definitions on offer yield essential common features which, taken 
together, yield a workable formulation in this context, as follows: military 
action by or approved by the U.N., in the territory of a state and without 
that state’s consent, which is significantly justified by a humanitarian 
concern for the citizens undergoing or imminently facing mass atrocities 
in the state.4 
 
 
to U.N. armed intervention to stop mass atrocities. There are, however, sources that flirt with the idea. 
See, e.g., Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The 
Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 329, 
329-30, 340-77 (1995) (urging recognition of a victim’s right to receive armed humanitarian 
intervention, but only in order to promote democracy where “circumstances constitute a humanitarian 
crisis involving human rights atrocities”); Celeste Poltak, Humanitarian Intervention: A Contemporary 
Interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations, 60 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 30-33 (2002) 
(conceiving a right to armed humanitarian intervention limited to alleviating the imminent danger of 
large-scale loss of life (but not to large-scale wounding or maiming)). Also, some sources advocate for 
the existence of a legal duty to intervene militarily to stop mass atrocities, but these writers do not 
address whether a correlative legal right to such intervention flows from the duty. See, e.g., Ibrahim J. 
Gassama, Dealing with the World as It Is: Reimagining Collective International Responsibility, 12 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 695, 731-38 (2013); Nico Krisch, Review Essay: Legality, Morality 
and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, 13 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 323, 333 
(2002) (mentioning in passing that “perhaps that there is a duty of the world organization” to intervene 
in a humanitarian crisis). 
 2. See AIDAN HEHIR, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: RHETORIC, REALITY AND THE FUTURE 
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 30 (2012) [hereinafter HEHIR, RESPONSIBILITY] (referring to Simon 
Chesterman for the proposition that “historically the problem has been the regularity of 
‘inhumanitarian non-intervention’ rather that a surfeit of purportedly ‘humanitarian’ interventions”); 
CHARLES W. KEGLEY WITH EUGENE R. WITTKOPF, WORLD POLITICS: TRENDS AND 
TRANSFORMATION 252 (2006) (referring to the “persistence of horrendous atrocities” despite the 
strengthening of international human rights law); see also Keith A. Petty, Human and National 
Security: The Law of Mass Atrocity Response Operations, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 745, 746, 749, 776 
(2013) (noting the failure of international institutions to thwart mass atrocities including the ongoing 
crimes occurring in Syria). 
 3. See HEHIR, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 160 (writing of the “myriad” definitions of the 
phrase “humanitarian intervention”).  
 4. Id. (quoting from AIDAN HEHIR, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INTRODUCTION 20 
(2010) [hereinafter “HEHIR, INTRODUCTION”]. 
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A denouement involving combat should, of course, never be a first 
choice.5 But, when peaceful conflict-resolution fails, the persuasiveness of 
coaxing or coercive words tends to evaporate. It is a terrible reality that 
sometimes there is no alternative to armed force if humanity, as noun and 
adjective, is to prevail.6 The proposed right thus is conceived solely to 
effectuate relief in such a situation. That is why the right is framed as 
conditional, i.e., dependent on a showing that non-violent strategies have 
failed or may reasonably be expected to fail. 
From what has been said above, it is self-evident that the proposed 
intervention right is not applicable to or useful for long-term prevention or 
post-conflict nation-building. This economy of scope is not meant to 
deride the critical importance of these sorts of intercessions. It is merely a 
case of author’s preference; I prefer to focus on the most urgent situation 
for the people under attack and where, as it happens, the current law is 
nearly impotent in saving them.7  
The new right’s objectives are also limited to humanitarian 
interventions against those mass atrocities caused by or which are a part of 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or ethnic cleansing.8 The 
fact is that most mass atrocities are engendered by or constitutive of one of 
the foregoing malefactions, and that the limitation has become a received 
norm. 
Nevertheless, the proposed right is not envisioned, despite its relative 
audacity, as a failsafe way of guaranteeing suppression of all mass 
atrocities. This Article sees the right as serving the much humbler and, 
hopefully, more realistic mission of making international law substantially 
more instrumental in causing legitimate U.N. armed interventions to 
happen and happen successfully when the aim is halting mass atrocities. 
It should not be lost sight of either, that although the right would be 
available to all victims, their successful assertion of it would require 
 
 
 5. Id. at 150 (observing that “[o]ne must certainly have reservations about the utilization of 
often massive military force and its resultant causalities, in the name of humanitarianism”). 
 6. See Gassama, supra note 1, at 699, 706, 711, 715 (discussing the reluctance of some to pin 
hopes for achieving humanitarian objectives on military means, but nevertheless arguing for a legal 
duty to use physical force to stop mass atrocities “as a last gasp response”). 
 7. See infra notes 18-25, 75-87, 90-91 and accompanying text. 
 8. CRISTINA GABRIELA BADESCU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT: SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 133 (2011); HEHIR, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 
149, 162-64; but see Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons 
from Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1770-74 (2000) (positing, as justification for armed 
humanitarian intervention, goals consistent with the purposes of the United Nations, including 
amelioration of gross and systemic human rights abuses); Poltak, supra note 1, at 30-32 (proposing 
that humanitarian intervention by armed force should be restricted to cases where the right to life is 
presently or imminently imperiled on a large scale). 
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fulfillment only under the condition mentioned above and would be 
advanced most advantageously with the help of  procedures detailed later 
in these pages.9 For now, it should be noted that the recommended 
procedures would entail at least four reforms in the U.N. system; and, it 
may as well be confessed at the outset that one of those would affect 
Security Council veto powers, though exclusively with respect to the 
subject of whether to authorize armed interventions against mass 
atrocities.10 
I suspect that the mere mention of tampering with the veto is enough to 
induce many readers to heave a sigh of weariness. It is common 
knowledge that the Council’s permanent members are extremely jealous of 
the veto and resistant to any weakening of it.11 Thus, a mere eight 
paragraphs in, some readers may conclude that advocacy of the new right, 
in tandem with circumscribing this aspect of big-power dominance, is 
dead on arrival. Let me suggest that, like Mark Twain’s first obituary, a 
pronouncement of death at this juncture is premature.12 Though the idea of 
the peoples’ right, supported by this sort of profound structural reform, is 
admittedly iconoclastic, the idea still deserves a full hearing. After all, the 
life and limb of many people are at stake; nothing has yet solved the 
problem of rescuing them from atrocity when peaceful means are 
unavailing, and the proposed remedial scheme of a peoples’ right has 
rarely been considered and, even then, only in a cursory or ambivalent 
way.13 
Indeed, one era’s iconoclasm may well become a later era’s 
conventional wisdom. The accuracy of this observation can be 
corroborated by just a few miscellaneous historical illustrations, e.g., 
before the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, American 
women had no right to vote, and, to many at the time, female suffrage was 
 
 
 9. See infra notes 220-60 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 239-52 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Richard Butler, Reform of the United Nations Security Council, 1 PENN ST. J. L. & INT’L 
AFF. 23, 31 (2012) (contending that the veto-holders on the Security Council view the veto as their 
right and entitlement); Saira Mohamed, Shame in the Security Council, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1191, 
1210-13 (2013) (tracing the history of the permanent members’ insistence on having a veto in the 
Security Council). 
 12. See Mark Twain Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/ 
quotes/m/marktwain141773.html (setting forth Mark Twain’s witticism that, “The reports of my death 
have been greatly exaggerated”). 
 13. See, e.g., Sara Dillon, Yes, No, Maybe: Why No Clear “Right” of the Ultra-Vulnerable to 
Protection Via Humanitarian Intervention?, 20 MICH. ST. INT’L. L. REV. 179, 181-82, 188 (2012) 
(arguing for a right of only the “extremely vulnerable” to humanitarian intervention against mass 
attacks); Adam Roberts, The So-Called “Right” of Humanitarian Intervention, in 3 Y.B. OF INT’L 
HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 3, 50-51 (H. Fischer & Avril McDonald eds., 2000) (asking whether it is 
productive to think of humanitarian intervention as a right). 
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unthinkable.14 The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, as of 
1989, invested the child who is mature enough to form his or her own 
views, with “the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting 
the child;”15 before then, popular sentiment was that children should be 
seen and not heard.16 And, during the Spanish Inquisition, could anyone 
have contemplated promulgation of a legal right to be free of torture?17 
A new idea may seem strange when initially articulated and also turn 
out to be a bad idea. I am confident that a peoples’ right to U.N. armed 
intervention to stop mass atrocities is far from being a bad idea for two 
reasons. From a juridical perspective, the new right conceptually fits 
within or arises from other rights and principles of international law, and 
that is so without the least belaboring or distortion.18 
A second reason for recognizing a peoples’ right to U.N. armed 
intervention stems from urgent policy considerations; again, that business 
of protecting life and limb. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, most armed 
conflicts have occurred intrastate as have war crimes, genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.19 In response, the world has 
usually stood on the sidelines or intervened without sufficient 
peacekeepers and materiél to provide full-scale relief.20 The bloody 
specters of Rwanda and Sierra Leone during the 1990s manifest the 
persistence of this pattern,21 and, as of this writing, the trend continues 
 
 
 14. See U.S. CONST. amend XIX (prohibiting U.S. citizens from being denied the right to vote 
“on account of sex”); see also 19th Amendment, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics 
/womens-history/19th-amendment (describing the women’s suffrage movement in the United States as 
a “70-year battle”).  
 15. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 12, ¶ 1, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990). [hereinafter Children’s Convention]. 
 16. See Karen Hellisvig-Gaskell, What Does “Kids Should Be Seen & Not Heard” Mean? 
GLOBALPOST, http://everydaylife.globalpost.com/kids-should-seen-not-heard-mean-13068.html 
(noting that the phrase means that a child’s role is to be quiet, an idea that has “lingered well into the 
20th century”). 
 17. See Shanna Freeman, How the Spanish Inquisition Worked, HISTORY: HOW STUFF WORKS, 
http://history.howstuffworks.com/historical-figures/spanish-inquisition3.htm (recounting that torture 
was regularly used during the Spanish Inquisition to extract confessions). 
 18. See infra notes 92-218 and accompanying text. 
 19. See MICHAEL V. BHATIA, WAR AND INTERVENTION: ISSUES FOR CONTEMPORARY PEACE 
OPERATIONS 31 (2003) (recounting that, over the past fifty years, war has been much more prevalent 
within nations than between them). 
 20. See Rajan Manon, Pious Words, Puny Deeds: The “International Community” and Mass 
Atrocities, in INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN LOCAL CONFLICTS: CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION SINCE THE COLD WAR 243, 243-52 (Uzi Rabi ed., 2010) (commenting on the 
global community’s disinclination to stop mass atrocities with armed intervention). 
 21. For a detailed description of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, see ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE 
HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA passim (2003). Mass atrocities 
were perpetrated in Sierra Leone in the late 1990s and early 2000s. ALEX J. BELLAMY, MASSACRES 
AND MORALITY: MASS ATROCITIES IN AN AGE OF CIVILIAN IMMUNITY 300 (2012); see also Lee 
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particularly in Africa and the Middle East.22 Elsewhere, and because no 
community is immune, people may be haunted by an underlying fear that 
they too could someday suffer such a fate. And, are we not all slowly and 
imperceptibly brutalized by the frequent spectacle of indiscriminate 
carnage allowed to proceed to the last bloody drop? These are no small 
psychological burdens, whether they operate consciously or 
subconsciously.23  
In any event, surely the victims of mass atrocity should be the primary 
rights-holders empowered to demand protection against it. They are the 
ones who die or are maimed, they are the ones who watch the rape and 
killing of family and friends, and they are the ones who are frequently left 
destitute and homeless. For the survivors of such an attack, the 
accompanying emotional trauma is incalculable; gruesome memories, their 
mental prison and destiny.24  
Any civilized legal regime worth the name should, at a minimum, 
avoid aggravating the victims’ plight. It is therefore appalling to realize 
that international law actually worsens the situation by leaving the 
afflicted legally helpless to help themselves. The law effectively delivers a 
one-two punch, first, by allowing disregard of victims’ physical safety, 
and, second, by vitiating their human dignity. In having failed to grant 
victims juridical power to invoke a U.N. armed response, it is entirely 
discretionary whether an intervention occurs.25 The result is that victims 
are relegated to charity cases, and the charity is a notoriously 
 
 
Ferran,  Charles Taylor, African Warlord, Convicted for Role in Sierra Leone Atrocities, ABC NEWS 
(Apr. 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/charles-taylor-african-warlord-convicted-sierra-leone-
atrocities/story?id=16218011 (referring to the conviction, by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, of 
Charles Taylor for perpetrating atrocities in that country). 
 22. See, e.g., Genocide in Darfur, UNITED HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, www.united 
humanrights.org/genocide/genocide-in-sudan.htm (referring to an “ongoing genocide” in Darfur, 
which claims five thousand lives every month); Countries at Risk, GENOCIDEWATCH,  
http://genocidewatch.net/alerts-2/new-alerts/ (noting the existence of continuing genocides in Somalia 
and Nigeria); Nick Cymming-Bruce, United Nations Investigators Accuse ISIS of Genocide Over 
Attacks on Yazidis, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/20/world/ 
middleeast/isis-genocide-yazidis-iraq-un-panel.html?_r=0 (reporting on ISIS attacks on the Yazidis in 
Iraq, with apparent intent to eliminate them as a group); Kareem Shaheen, Syrian War: “Unthinkable 
Atrocities” Document in Report on Aleppo,  THE GUARDIAN (May 5, 2015), https://www.theguardian. 
com/world/2015/may/05/syria-forces-war-crime-barrel-bombs-aleppo-amnesty-report (citing a 2015 
Amnesty International Report on the widespread atrocities perpetrated on civilians in Syria). 
 23. See ROBERT J. LIFTON & GREG MITCHELL, HIROSHIMA IN AMERICA 338-40 (1996) 
(analyzing the phenomenon of psychic numbing as it affects persons other than the direct victims of 
mass violence). 
 24. Though told from the vantage point of a blue helmet rather than from that of a victim of mass 
atrocity, Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Dallaire’s description of the 1993-1994 Rwandan genocide is 
incomparable in conveying the victims’ physical and mental anguish. See DALLAIRE, supra note 21, 
passim. 
 25. See supra notes 29-86 and accompanying text. 
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parsimonious and unreliable one at that. The law, instead of expressly 
affirming victims’ natural right to fight back in a meaningful way,26 
ignores their status as full-fledged human beings with the autonomy to 
determine their own fate at the most basic level. This omission all but 
proclaims the unworthiness of the fallen.  
An armed response to mass atrocity is, of course, a complex, daunting 
enterprise involving many actors from a variety of disciplines;27 law is but 
a single factor in the mix. One cannot, therefore, prophesize that 
optimizing international law as a corrective will definitely make a big 
difference for the victims and potential victims. Yet, who would be so 
morally daring as to decline open-minded consideration of a juridical 
innovation devised to spare their fellows? 
This Article is organized along the following lines. Part II has dual 
purposes. It is a description of the present state of international law on 
U.N. armed intervention to stop mass atrocities. This Part is also a critique 
inasmuch as it simultaneously analyzes the deficiencies in the international 
laws governing these interventions.28 Part III lays out the juridical bases 
for a peoples’ right to U.N. armed intervention to stop mass atrocities.29 
Finally, Part IV proposes certain reforms to the U.N. system in order to 
fully effectuate that right.30 
II. INTERPRETATION OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW PERMITTING BUT 
NOT REQUIRING U.N. AUTHORIZED ARMED INTERVENTIONS TO STOP 
MASS ATROCITIES: A JURISTIC SILENCE OF THE GRAVE 
The U.N. Charter31 is part of jus ad bellum, the corpus of international 
law placing limits on the reasons for engaging in armed aggression.32 In 
this capacity, the Charter governs the United Nations’ reasons for fielding 
or authorizing other entities to field military forces.33 As discussed in 
detail below, treaty interpretation demonstrates that the Charter does 
 
 
 26. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, (1690), reprinted in 
JURISPRUDENCE TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 239, 242, 256, 264, 272 (George 
C. Christie & Patrick H. Martin eds., 1995). 
 27. The United Nations’ Peacekeeping website identifies various types of blue helmets, including 
infantry soldiers, police, engineers, transport companies, and communications and medical personnel. 
Military, U.N. PEACEKEEPING, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/military/index.shtml. 
 28. See infra notes 29-91 and accompanying text.  
 29. See infra notes 92-218 and accompanying text. 
 30. See infra notes 92-218 and accompanying text.  
 31. U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945). 
 32. See infra notes 219-60 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
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permit U.N. armed intervention to stop mass atrocities. But neither the 
document’s explicit language nor its interpretation creates a right to 
invoke and a conjunct duty to provide such intervention. It is this void that 
has rendered international law mostly unresponsive and irresponsible 
when armed intervention is needed to stop mass atrocities, a juristic 
silence which has begotten the silence of victims’ graves. 
U.N. armed intervention is authorized by Chapter VII of the Charter if 
certain prerequisites are met.34 The Security Council must preliminarily 
determine the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression;35 and, if the Council so finds, it must next assess whether 
measures not involving use of armed force—the sorts of pacific measures 
specified in article 4136—would be or have proven inadequate to maintain 
or restore international peace and security.37 Only upon a finding of such 
inadequacy may the Council “take such action by air, sea, or land forces as 
may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”38 As per Chapter VIII, armed interventions by other entities may 
legally take place solely if instituted by regional arrangement or agencies 
which have first obtained Security Council permission.39 
The Charter, it is true, does not explicitly refer to “armed 
interventions” or “mass atrocities.” This has led to some niggling among 
some international law experts as to whether the Charter really does 
provide for U.N. armed interventions to stop mass atrocities.40 As will be 
shown, the naysaying is easily rebutted by other Charter provisions in light 
of accepted principles of treaty interpretation.41 
However, before delving further into the legal aspects of U.N. 
intervention, it is probably appropriate to first deal with the two elephants 
in the room, i.e., this Article’s disinclination to cover armed humanitarian 
interventions by one nation or a group of them sans U.N. approval 
(“unilateral armed intervention”), and the Article’s inattention to the 
 
 
 34. U.N. Charter ch. VII. 
 35. Id. art. 39. 
 36. U.N. Charter Article 41 provides: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to 
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.  
Id. art. 41.  
 37. Id. art. 42. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. arts. 52-53. 
 40. See infra notes 73, 77 and accompanying text. 
 41. See infra notes 56-85 and accompanying text. 
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responsibility to protect project (“R2P”). It should be noted that 
controversy has dragged on for years over the legality of unilateral 
interventions.42 Then, with the 2010 adoption of the Kampala 
Compromise43 international lawmakers placed a heavy damper on the pro-
legality advocates. The Compromise’s tacit but transparent rebuff is 
provided as an amendment to the Rome Statute, for the activation in 2017 
of the International Criminal Court’s (“ICC”) subject-matter jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression.44 The crime of aggression is delineated 
thereunder as consisting of, among other elements, an act of aggression 
which constitutes “the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent” with the U.N. Charter.45 
The only recognized exception to the crime of aggression is the 
Charter’s allowance for nations, individually or collectively, to use 
physical force in self-defense against another nation. There is no exception 
for nations to carry out unilateral armed humanitarian interventions.46 
Thus, as of 2017, non-U.N. authorized armed interventions with the goal 
of halting mass atrocities, could subject individuals executing the 
interventions to prosecution before the ICC for having perpetrated the 
crime of aggression.47 In other words, the Compromise should disable and 
 
 
 42. See CRISTINA GABRIELA BADESCU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1-2 (2011) (giving an overview of the 
disagreements and dilemmas that have long surrounded the legality and morality of unilateral armed 
humanitarian intervention); Maj. Jeremy A. Haugh, Beyond R2P: A Proposed Test for Legalizing 
Unilateral Armed Humanitarian Intervention, 221 MIL. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2014) (tacitly acknowledging 
the historical and present illegality of unilateral armed humanitarian intervention, while expressly 
urging creation of a relevant new governing legal regime); Sean D. Murphy, Criminalizing 
Humanitarian Intervention, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 341, 341 (2009) (stating that the dominant 
belief among scholars is that unilateral armed humanitarian intervention is illegal). 
 43. Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression, Res. RC/Res. 6, Annex 1 adopted on June 
11, 2010 [hereinafter New Def]. 
 44. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, ¶ 1, adopted on July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 91 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The language on the crime of 
aggression, as originally set forth in the Rome Statute, was essentially a placeholder: 
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted 
in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions 
under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision 
shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 45. New Def, supra note 43. 
 46. See Jennifer Trahan, A Meaningful Definition of the Crime of Aggression: A Response to 
Michael Glennon, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 907, 927 (2012) (maintaining that a nation’s or nations’ 
exercise of individual or collective self-defense is permissible under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and 
“thus are uses of armed force consistent with the . . . Charter, and clearly not acts of aggression”).  
  
 44. Surendran Koran, The International Criminal Court and Crimes of Aggression: Beyond the 
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discourage future arguments for the legality of unilateral armed 
intervention to stop mass atrocities. 
On the policy front, it is fair to say that these sorts of interventions 
against atrocities are fraught with negative unintended consequences. 
Foremost is the damage that such interventions may wreak upon the 
United Nations and the rule of international law. Because the intervenors 
act outside of and in violation of the U.N. Charter’s prescriptions, they 
implicitly transmit the message that the United Nations and its Charter are 
not the only show in town, and, ultimately, do not matter very much when 
it comes to ending these crises.48 Moreover, these interventions have often 
been led by big-power countries, each of which has usually had a national 
interest at stake in addition to or in lieu of humanitarianism.49 This 
circumstance has been and is apt to stoke fears that intervening states are 
using mass atrocities as a convenient pretext for underlying imperialist and 
neo-colonial agendas50—fears that may be generalized toward helping 
 
 
Kampala Convention, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 231, 256 (2012). 
 48. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., Consent-Based Humanitarian Intervention: Giving Sovereign 
Responsibility Back to the Sovereign, 46 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 499, 535 (2013) (opining that attempts 
to carve out exceptions to the current international law governing humanitarian intervention may end 
up swallowing the rule of international law); Michael L. Burton, Note, Legalizing the Sublegal: A 
Proposal for Codifying a Doctrine of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention, 85 GEO. L. J. 417, 429 
(1996) (averring that unlawful unilateral humanitarian intervention degrades international law). 
 Incidentally, this Article’s concern about undermining the United Nations and international law is 
not meant to suggest that they are presently adequate to the task of halting mass atrocities. Indeed, this 
Article argues to the contrary. See infra notes 56-85 and accompanying text.  
 In the interests of fair play, it is only right to mention an argument in support of the legality of 
unilateral armed humanitarian intervention. Before the advent of the U.N. Charter, customary 
international law existed which authorized this sort of intervention. However, there is disagreement 
over whether this norm survived the Charter’s inception. Richard B. Lillich, A United States Policy of 
Humanitarian Intervention and Intercession, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
278, 287-88 (Donald P. Kommers & Gilburt D. Loescher eds., 1979). I decline to dwell on the 
argument or the controversy surrounding it for two reasons. First, regardless of the legal status of the 
norm, I prefer U.N. armed intervention to halt mass atrocities for policy reasons laid out in the text 
above. Second, even if this customary international law still persists, its usefulness should be greatly 
diminished by the Kampala Compromise. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text. 
 49. The U.S. military intervention in Iraq is a prime example of the syndrome in which a big-
power nation dons the mantle of humanitarianism to invade another country for self-serving purposes. 
GARY J. BASS, FREEDOM’S BATTLE: THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 379 (2008); 
Kenneth Roth, War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE “WAR ON 
TERROR” 143-45 (Richard Ashby Wilson ed., 2005). 
 Conversely, the U.S. has declined to intervene militarily to stop mass atrocities—most infamously 
in 1994 Rwanda—on the grounds that U.S. national interests were not implicated. Lieutenant 
Commander Glenn T. Ware, JAGC, USN, The Emerging Norm of Humanitarian Intervention and 
Presidential Decision Directive 25, 44 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1997). 
 50. See HEHIR, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 198-99 (elucidating that, given the developing 
world’s historical experiences under colonialism, it is understandable that such nations would fear 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, based, as it is, on hierarchies rather than law); TERRENCE E. 
PAUPP, REDEFINING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT 406-07 (2014) 
(pointing out that the United States and NATO, for example, have “attempted to revive the old systems 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
256 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 16:245 
 
 
 
 
hands extended by all outsiders even if motivated by purely humanitarian 
concerns.51  
It may be argued that the deleterious ripple effects of unilateral armed 
interventions cannot do much damage to U.N. prestige inasmuch as the 
latter has already done quite a bit to impugn its own credibility.52 The 
United Nations is admittedly dysfunctional in many ways. Nevertheless, it 
is there. And, its mere existence is no minor asset. To undercut or 
thoroughly subvert it and begin anew is hardly cost-efficient in view of the 
fact that the organization provides, at the very least, the foundation for 
making international governance responsive to the modern era. On all 
counts, the best course appears to be to reserve armed humanitarian 
intervention solely for the United Nations, the tack taken from hereon. 
This Article’s disregard of the responsibility to protect project53 is 
predicated on equally solid ground. R2P began as an ostensible attempt to, 
among other things, assure that U.N. armed intervention would occur on a 
more dependable basis so as to prevent and/or stop large-scale loss of 
human life.54 While R2P has become a darling of the United Nations, 55 
the doctrine’s finer points and positive aspects are altogether nugatory to 
the instant endeavor. My harsh evaluation stems from a simple fact: R2P is 
 
 
of domination under the banner of [unilateral] ‘humanitarian intervention’” and that this has stoked 
fears in the Global South). 
 51. See HEHIR, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 203-04 (discussing how third-world nations are 
suspicious of humanitarian intervenors hailing from most quarters because of the self-serving politics 
driving powerful governments, whether the latter operate on their own or through Security Council 
machinations). 
 52. Id. at 203 (highlighting the Security Council’s “inconsistency and evident politicization” vis-
à-vis “military intervention for humanitarian purposes”); Richard Falk, Humanitarian Intervention 
After Kosovo, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE LINKS BETWEEN RIGHTS, LAW, AND 
PEACEBUILDING 185, 203-04 (Julie Mertus & Jeffrey W. Helsing eds., 2006) (critiquing the United 
Nations’ “enforcement capabilities,” the veto power of the Security Council’s permanent members, 
and the latter’s tendency to give more weight to geopolitical interests than to humanitarian needs); 
Henry J. Richardson III, Critical Perspectives on Intervention 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 12, 29-35 (2014) 
(expatiating on the corrupting effect of the Security Council’s veto power on humanitarian 
intervention). 
 53. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text. 
 54. See REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 19-44 (2001) (articulating early principles of R2P); 
INTERNATIONAL COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop/learn-about-rtop 
(describing a more modern version of R2P). 
 55. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISER ON THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (April 16, 2014), www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/ 
responsibility.shtml (evidencing the United Nations’ embrace of R2P); HEHIR, RESPONSIBILITY, supra 
note 2, at 90-103 (detailing some of the historical development of the United Nations’ implementation 
of R2P). 
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not law.56 The concept is just that—a concept. R2P does not bind any 
person or entity; R2P creates no rights, obligations or accountability. R2P 
instead relies exclusively on moral suasion, a game plan with a notoriously 
poor record of spurring armed force for humanitarian ends.57 At any rate, 
this is a law review article about law and making law’s mandated 
compulsions more effective in bringing about the needed military 
assistance. R2P heads in exactly an opposite and inapposite direction. 
Having ushered the elephants in the room well out of it, we return to 
Part II’s main theme of presenting and interrogating the international law 
governing U.N. armed intervention to stop mass atrocities. This Part’s 
opening paragraphs canvass in their bare essentials those U.N. Charter 
provisions most germane to serving as a legal underpinning for U.N. 
armed interventions. It will be recalled that these provisions under Charter 
Chapter VII endow the Security Council with power to use or authorize 
the use of armed force if certain preconditions are met by the Council and 
if the use is necessary to maintaining or restoring international peace and 
security.58 Indeed, the plain language of Charter article 42 baldly 
proclaims that the Council may “take . . . action by air, sea, or land forces” 
in fulfillment of its maintaining and restoring roles.59 
But, does article 42 implicitly give the Security Council power to take 
or authorize military steps for the purpose of stopping mass atrocities? 
Inasmuch as the answer to this question is not immediately obvious from 
the provision’s wording, the matter requires interpretation, though not too 
much is needed. All treaty interpretation is governed by article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”).60 
Article 31 states, in pertinent part: 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.  
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble…61 
Article 31’s rule that a treaty term must be construed in keeping with its 
“ordinary meaning” presupposes that a term may be capable of more than 
 
 
 56. See HEHIR, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 119-22 (criticizing R2P’s reliance on moral 
pressure alone to stop mass atrocities). 
 57. Id. at 128-30. 
 58. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. 
 59. U.N. Charter art. 42. 
 60. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]. 
 61. Id. art. 31, ¶¶ 1-2. 
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one meaning.62 According to Webster’s dictionary, a long-established 
definition of the adjective “ordinary” is “of a kind to be expected in the 
normal order of events.”63 Article 31, paragraph 1 thus automatically 
refers the treaty interpreter to his or her own life experiences and 
knowledge-base in order to distinguish ordinariness from its opposite. 
Leafing through any modern English-language dictionary readily 
demonstrates that a word may often encompass several different meanings, 
some of which may strike us as ordinary and some not. A perfect example 
of such a multifaceted word coincidentally is the word “ordinary,” for 
which Webster’s, in addition to the definition quoted above, supplies two 
others, with one of those still further subdivided into two different 
senses.64 
Human rights and humanitarian law treaties often employ sweeping or 
nebulous language,65 a perfect candidate for a plurality of connotations. 
Under Article 31, there is no bar to interpreting an explicit treaty term as 
encompassing implied multiple meanings as long as any implied meaning 
is also an ordinary one.66 Underlying these adjurations is Article 31’s 
ambition to assure that explicit treaty language not be construed in an 
“arcane, or crabbed manner, devoid of” language’s natural and sometimes 
unstated richness.67 
Were the above-described interpretive device the only one properly 
involved in treaty interpretation, it could and should be objected that 
Security Council-authorized interventionist use of force to stop mass 
atrocities is probably not an ordinary meaning easily flowing from Charter 
Article 42’s wording. However, the Vienna Convention supplements its 
“ordinary meaning” rule with further interpretive precepts. The 
Convention’s Article 31 directs that ordinary meaning must be determined 
in the “context [of the treaty] and in the light of its object and purpose,” 
with context understood to include the treaty’s preamble plus the entire 
remainder of the treaty text.68  
Turning to the Charter’s preamble and text beyond Article 42, it 
 
 
 62. See Susan H. Bitensky, The Mother of All Human Rights: The Child’s Right to Be Free of 
Corporal Punishment as Hard International Law, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 701, 717-19 (2010) 
[hereinafter Bitensky, Hard International Law]. 
 63. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 831 (1983). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Susan H. Bitensky, The Poverty of Precedent for School Corporal Punishment’s 
Constitutionality Under the Eighth Amendment, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327, 1381 (2009) [hereinafter 
Bitensky, Poverty of Precedent]. 
 66. See Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31. 
 67. Bitensky, Hard International Law, supra note 62, at 718. 
 68. Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31, ¶¶ 1-2. 
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becomes clear that the preservation and promotion of human rights is a 
principal commitment of the United Nations. The preamble avouches that 
U.N. objectives include, among other things, reaffirming “faith in 
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person”; 
establishing “conditions under which justice and respect for . . . 
international law can be maintained”; striving to “live together in peace 
with one another as good neighbors”; and “ensuring . . . that armed force 
shall not be used, save in the common interest[.]”69  
Charter Article 1 also avers that a raison d’être of the United Nations is 
“[t]o achieve international cooperation in solving international problems 
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character” as well as “in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all.”70 Articles 55 and 56 jointly transform Article 1’s 
declaration of purpose into a firm commitment of the U.N. and of states 
parties to the Charter that they will promote “universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all[.]”71 
In sum, the Charter’s preamble and its Articles 1, 55, and 56 elucidate 
an “overall object and purpose” and interpretive “context” of upholding 
human rights; and, Article 42 should consequently be informed thereby. 
Stopping mass atrocities is tantamount to securing an array of human 
rights from trespass.72 Under international human rights law (“IHRL”), 
each person has the rights to survival,73 privacy,74 and freedom from 
torture and other “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment[,]” among many other rights.75 Mass atrocities perforce 
deprive victims of any or all of these human rights. Hence, the ordinary 
meaning of Article 42’s stipulation that the Security Council may approve 
military forays “necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
 
 
 69. U.N. Charter preamble.  
 70. Id. art. 1, ¶ 3 (emphasis added).  
 71. Id. art. 55, ¶ (c), art. 56 (emphasis added). 
 72. See Julie Mertus, supra note 7, at 1770-74 (proposing that the international human right to 
life includes “the right to emergency assistance”); Roberts, supra note 12, at 8–9 (suggesting that the 
U.N. Charter’s references to human rights may allow for humanitarian intervention); Gassama, supra 
note 1, at 733-35 (finding that the U.N. Charter and subsequent human rights treaties have helped to 
“erase the legal . . . barriers to collective transnational humanitarian intervention”); cf. Anne Peters, 
Humanity as the Α and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 513, 539, 544 (2009) (contending that 
when the needs of humanity are threatened, the Security Council has a duty to intervene). 
 73. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, ¶ 1, opened for signature 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Children’s Convention, supra note 14, art. 6. 
 74. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 73, art. 17; European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8¶ 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) 
[hereinafter European Convention]. 
 75. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 73, art. 7; Children’s Convention, supra note14, art. 37, ¶ (a); 
American Convention on Human Rights art. 5, ¶ 2, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into 
force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention]. 
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security”76 should logically embrace Council-authorized use of armed 
force to secure such human rights (a point which, despite its logic, has 
attracted a vocal faction of deniers).77 The logical understanding of Article 
42 is incidentally buttressed by the Charter’s recurring affirmation of the 
close reciprocal relationship between human rights, on the one hand, and 
peace and security, on the other: neither is possible for long by itself, and 
each is a fundamental postulate to the long-term existence of the other.78 
It may be contended that the above interpretation of Article 42 must 
inevitably stumble upon the fact that the Charter’s concern is solely with 
international peace and security as opposed to intrastate peace and 
security. Article 42 itself specifically refers to international peace and 
security and is silent about the intrastate variety.79 It is also indisputable 
that mass atrocities generally occur within a single state.80 The contrarian 
could reasonably take these circumstances as grounds for saying that 
Article 42 does not allow authorization of armed force to end intrastate 
perpetration of mass atrocities.81 
Because the Charter was adopted against the backdrop of World War II 
and the Holocaust, and was made in reaction to their barbarities, the 
document is very much a creature of that era. It can be no surprise that the 
anxieties of citizenry and governments at the time fixated on international 
disputes and international wars,82 and that the Charter naturally reflects 
 
 
 76. U.N. Charter art. 42. 
 77. Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The 
Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 329, 
355–56, 372–73 (1995) (arguing that U.N. Charter Article 42 empowers the Security Council to use 
force to restore democracy and alleviate suffering); Mertus, supra note 8, at 1770–73; but see 
MOURTADA DEME, LAW, MORALITY, AND INTERNATIONAL ARMED INTERVENTION: THE UNITED 
NATIONS AND ECOWAS IN LIBERIA 24 (2013) (maintaining that U.N. Charter Article 42 does not 
embrace armed humanitarian intervention to protect human rights). 
 78. E.g., U.N. Charter, supra note 31, art. 55 (linking fulfillment of human rights to maintenance 
of peace); see Mertus, supra note 8, at 1770 (asserting that “international peace and security must 
mean more than the absence of an internationally recognized war, [and that] human rights violations 
short of all-out war also constitute major breaches of peace and security”). 
 79. U.N. Charter, supra note 31, art. 42. 
 80. See HEHIR, INTRODUCTION supra note 4, at 318 (remarking that intrastate atrocities occur 
“periodically”); STEPHEN MCLOUGHLIN, THE STRUCTURAL PREVENTION OF MASS ATROCITIES: 
UNDERSTANDING RISK AND RESILIENCE 31 (2014) (observing that since World War II most mass 
atrocities have occurred as part of intrastate wars).  
 81. Professor Aidan Hehir has summarized the contrarian thesis as raising “some doubt” on 
“[w]hether the application of Chapter VII powers to intra-state humanitarian crises was consistent with 
the Charter.” HEHIR, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 60. 
 82. See JUSSI M. HANHIMÄKI, THE UNITED NATIONS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 3 (2008) 
(chronicling that the United Nations’ founders desired to avoid a repeat of World War II); DAVID T. 
ZABECKI, WORLD WAR II IN EUROPE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 172 (describing the impetus for establishing 
the United Nations as prevention of “another world war”) (emphasis added). 
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this preoccupation.83 However, unless the Charter is to be reduced to a 
worthless trinket, its interpretation must be responsive to changing 
dilemmas and exigencies.84 This dynamic approach is consistent with the 
Vienna Convention’s ordinary-meaning rule of treaty construction since 
what treaty interpreters deem ordinary meanings are also likely to evolve 
over successive epochs.85  
The dynamic approach additionally is of a piece with Vienna 
Convention’s directive that treaties must be interpreted in good faith.86 If a 
treaty is in force, can an interpretation which would transform it, or parts 
of it, into a dead letter, be an “interpret[ation] in good faith”? Effectively 
destroying a substantive part of the Charter by confining it to obsolete 
meanings is not good faith interpretation when the Charter is capable of 
different, ordinary constructions relevant to its overarching objects and 
purposes in the contemporary world.87 
Threats to or breaches of international peace and security are now few 
and far between,88 and confining Article 42’s applicability solely to 
 
 
 83. E.g., U.N. Charter, supra note 31, at preamble, art. 1, ¶ 1, art. 2, ¶¶ 3, 6, art. 11, ¶¶ 1-3; art. 
15, ¶ 1, arts. 24, 26, art. 33, ¶ 1, art. 34, art. 37 ¶ 2, arts. 39, 42-43, art. 47, ¶ 1, art. 48, ¶ 1, art. 51, art. 
52, ¶ 1, art. 54, art. 73, ¶ (c), art. 76¶ (a), arts. 84, 99. In its introductory clause, Article 55 substitutes 
for “international peace and security” the analogous wording “peaceful and friendly relations among 
nations.”  Id. art 55. 
 84. The notion that a treaty should be a “living document” is sometimes advanced as a legal 
rationale for interpretations making the instrument applicable to evolving circumstances. For example, 
the European Court of Human rights has repeatedly said of the European Convention that the latter is a 
“living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.” See Selmouni v. 
France, 1109 Eur. Ct. H.R. 403 at ¶ 101 (2000) (See, e.g., Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 
5856/72, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 15-16 (1978); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) at 33 (1989); and Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 310 (1995)). In Selmouni, 
the European Court was considering petitioner’s claim that his treatment by police violated the 
Convention’s Article 3, i.e., the prohibition on cruel and degrading treatment and on torture. Id. 
Selmouni, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 101. The Court relied upon the living-document rationale to announce  
that certain acts which were classified in the past as “inhuman and degrading treatment” as 
opposed to “torture” could be classified differently in the future. It [the Court] takes the view 
that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights 
and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in 
assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies. 
Id. Cf., e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 682 (1952) (Vincent, J., 
dissenting) (“[c]ases do arise presenting questions which could not have been foreseen by the Framers. 
In such cases, the Constitution has been treated as a living document adaptable to new situations.”). 
The living-document principle espoused by various Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court are, of course, 
not international law. Nevertheless, that the principle has been invoked in relation to a foundational 
instrument such as the Constitution points to the appropriateness of using the principle in relation to 
the U.N. Charter, a foundational international law instrument. See Myres S. McDougal & Richard N. 
Gardner, The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival, 60 YALE L.J. 258, 282 (1951) 
(“[t]he Charter, like every written constitution, will be a living instrument”). 
 85. Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31, ¶ 1. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text. 
 88. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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interstate threats and breaches would be equivalent to erasing the 
provision from the Charter. Not only does such a result fail the good faith 
test, it falls far shy of the requirement that the Charter’s terms be given 
their ordinary meaning inasmuch as ordinary meanings of words cannot be 
null sets. Finally, the Security Council has long authorized armed 
humanitarian intervention to deal with intrastate emergencies. Indeed, 
Council usage appears to have overtaken and cut short the theoretical 
quibbling.89 
Even for one familiar with the U.N. Charter, it can still be disquieting 
upon revisiting it to note again the absence of any explicit empowerment 
vis-à-vis armed intervention to stop mass atrocities. One would think that 
by now this delegation of authority would be expressly stated, preferably 
in bold typeface or neon lights. It is therefore most fortuitous that run-of-
the-mill, accustomed interpretation of relevant Charter provisions, as 
analyzed above, shows that such legal power does exist. And it does not 
hurt that the international community has been acting upon that 
assumption.  
Legal empowerment is one thing, though, and institutional 
implementation quite another. The U.N.’s history of implementation in 
this context has been rife with political gamesmanship, inconsistency, 
missed opportunities, gross ineptitude, and a breathtaking indifference to 
mass atrocities’ abominations.90 Perhaps the kindest thing that may be said 
of U.N. praxis at the moment is that it is utterly unreliable and 
unpardonably stingy in authorizing armed force against mass atrocity. 
Both the law which has allowed such “implementation” and the bad 
practices themselves attest to an international regime in dire want of 
profound reform—reform making continuing political machinations and 
stony lassitude quite beside the point. The reform that appears to have the 
most potential for accomplishing this feat is a peoples’ right to U.N. armed 
 
 
 89. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 130 (2001) (stating that since 1991, the Security Council has been more apt to 
categorize internal conflicts as threats to international peace); HEHIR, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 
59 (explaining that since the 1990s, the Security Council has “expanded its interpretation of its 
Chapter VII powers to include intra-state humanitarian crises”); Gassama, supra note 1, at 708–09 
(advising that there has been a clear understanding even from the very beginning of the United Nations 
that a local conflict may expand into one threatening international peace and security); Peters, supra 
note 69, at 538 (enunciating that, since the 1990s, it has been indisputable that the Security Council 
may authorize coercive interventions to address domestic human rights violations as threats to peace). 
 90. See BADESCU, supra note 8, at 1 (summarizing the many instances when the United Nations 
did not react to stop humanitarian crises); ROSA FREEDMAN, FAILING TO PROTECT: THE UN AND THE 
POLITICIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS xvi (2015) (assessing that the United Nations, on balance, has had 
“vastly more failures than successes” in protecting people from mass atrocities). 
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intervention, which when properly asserted, should be regardfully honored 
and the intervention undertaken.91 
Actually, there is no dearth of references to a legal right in aid of 
terminating atrocities, but it is jarring to realize that, thus far, the right is 
conceptualized as held exclusively by nation states and, perhaps, by 
intergovernmental organizations (“IGOs”).92 Legal history shows that 
nations have traditionally been understood to enjoy many rights under 
international law, e.g., rights to self-preservation, independence, equality, 
respect, and intercourse; nor have the sovereign’s rights yet faded from the 
legal lexicon.93 However, due to the Kampala Compromise, a sovereign’s 
ability to engage in armed humanitarian intervention will soon run into 
major obstacles under international criminal law.94 It would be both poetic 
and real-world justice if the sovereign’s expiring intervention right 
serendipitously was supplanted by a new peoples’ right to U.N. armed 
intervention. Not only would this work a bold and beneficial stroke 
towards democratization by putting the right in peoples rather than 
sovereigns, but, more immediately and crucially, the conversion should 
drastically improve the odds of halting or at least decreasing mass 
atrocities.95 
Despite its potentiality and appeal, the projected right will obviously 
not be of much use if it is stalled at wishful thinking; and so on to the 
vitally important exercise of establishing a juridical basis for its 
recognition. The task is gratifying as the tenable bases are many. 
III. JURIDICAL BASES FOR RECOGNITION OF A CONDITIONAL PEOPLES’ 
RIGHT TO REQUIRE U.N. AUTHORIZED ARMED INTERVENTION TO STOP 
MASS ATROCITIES 
 
 
 91. See infra notes 93, 98, 102-05, 108, 112-15, 132, 152-68 and accompanying text. 
 92. E.g., ANDREW CLAPHAM, BRIERLY’S LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE OF 
INTERNATIONAL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 47 (2012); Antonio Cassese, States: Rise and Decline 
of the Primary Subjects of the International Community, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 49, 55 (Bardo Fassbinder et al., eds, 2014); Krisch, supra note 1, at 326; 
Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of 
ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 333, 333 (1998); Elias 
Davidsson, Comment on Fernando Teson’s Article: “Defending International Law,” 11 INT’L LEGAL 
THEORY 99, 103 (2005); Halil Rahman Basaran, Identifying the Responsibility to Protect, 38-WTR 
FLETCHER R. WORLD AFF. 195 196 (2014); Margaret M. DeGuzman, When Are International Crimes 
Just Cause for War?, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. 73, 115 (2014). 
 93. CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: RULES FOR GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 50–51 (2005); see generally Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of 
the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982) (referring to sovereign 
states’ pre-1945 “lordly privilege of being the sole possessors of rights under international law”). 
 94. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text. 
 95. See infra notes 93, 98, 102-05, 108, 112-15, 132, 152-68 and accompanying text. 
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It is a staple of legal analysis to deduce the existence of one right from 
another, existing right.96 Nor is it at all unusual for the deduced right to be 
one that is instrumental in effectuating the “host” right from which it 
originated.97 On the domestic front, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has often employed this technique in interpreting the Constitution 
(sometimes even recognizing an implied fundamental constitutional right 
as stemming from another implied constitutional right).98 The European 
Court of Human Rights (“European Court”) has done the equivalent in 
interpreting the European Convention.99 International law experts have 
likewise frequently argued for inferring human rights from extant ones.100 
Accordingly, this Article relies upon the same general technique to find, 
latent in present-day international law, a peoples’ right to U.N. armed 
intervention to stop mass atrocities. 
1. The Easy Case: Deriving the Peoples’ Right From Existing 
International Human Rights Laws Against Violence 
Each mass atrocity is necessarily comprised, in its component parts, of 
serious, violent human rights abuses.101 The new right would enable 
people to demand that they be meaningfully protected from those 
abuses—abuses already deemed legal violations. Couched in this way, it 
may sound like the new right would be a pointless redundancy—until the 
element of scale is introduced. To state the irrefutable, what demarcates 
violent human rights violations suffered individually or in small clusters 
 
 
 96. See Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. 
Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 574 
(1992) (explaining that implied rights under the U.S. Constitution are not aberrational); Nicholas A.J. 
Croquet, The European Court of Human Rights’ Norm-Creation and Norm-Limiting Processes: 
Resolving a Normative Tension, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 307, 308 (2011) (asserting that the European 
Court uses “a mechanism of implied inference” to protect certain implied human rights); Thio Li-ann, 
Reading Rights Rightly: The UDHR and Its Creeping Influence on the Development of Singapore 
Public Law, 2008 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 264, 285–87 (2008) (contending that an implied right to a fair 
trial may be inferred from the Singapore constitution, in accordance with judicial precedents). 
 97. See, e.g., Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine, App. No. 30499/03 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 24–30 (2011) 
(holding that an express treaty right to private and family life implicitly gives rise to a right to be free 
of environmental hazards); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (the right of association 
“is not expressly included in the First Amendment [but] its existence is necessary in making the 
express guarantees fully meaningful”). 
 98. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–86 (finding that a fundamental marital privacy right 
implicitly derives from the constitutional right of association—itself a right inferred from the explicit 
provisions of the First Amendment). 
 99. See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text. 
 100. See infra notes 184, 190-94 and accompanying text. 
 101. See infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text. 
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from mass atrocities, is that in the latter the casualties always occur on a 
grand scale in terms of numbers of people victimized. Both situations 
clamor for a protective response, but in connection with mass atrocities, 
precisely because they are en masse, the only remedy (when non-violent 
tactics fail or are reasonably expected to fail) is troops and armaments. 
Settling for less in that instance is to give carte blanche to the worst 
human rights violators—those whose bloodlust craves hordes of victims. 
The new right, then, would not be redundant, and would cohere with the 
substance and spirit of IHRL. That the intervention right also designates 
the mechanism for effectuating protection, as it must in order to subdue 
the assailants, is hardly anomalous; IHRL currently contains numerous 
rights with included designations of the mechanisms of fulfillment, though 
not usually of the military sort.102  
Most of the recognized human rights which protect against the various 
constitutive acts of mass atrocities, are set forth in human rights treaties. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) is the 
most comprehensive treaty articulating such rights, i.e., the civil and 
political ones.103 For example, Article 6, paragraph 1 provides, in pertinent 
part: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. . . . No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.”104 The Human Rights Committee 
(“HRC”), the ICCPR’s treaty-monitoring body, has repeatedly proclaimed 
that the right to life “is the supreme right,”105 and, ICCPR article 4 makes 
it a right from which no derogation is permitted.106 Providing a rule of 
construction, the HRC has cautioned that the right to life must be 
 
 
 102. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2, ¶ 1, Jan. 3, 
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter  ICESCR] (directing states parties 
as to how to fulfill ICESCR rights, i.e., by taking “steps . . . to the maximum of its available resources, 
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights . . . by all appropriate means”); 
Id. art. 6, ¶ 2 (spelling out steps to be taken by states parties in fulfilling the ICESCR’s right to work); 
ICCPR, supra note 73, art. 3, ¶ (a)-(c) (binding each state party to provide and enforce remedies for 
violation of ICCPR rights); Id. at Part IV (detailing manner of implementing ICCPR); Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment arts. 4, 14, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter CAT] (mandating that each state party 
must criminalize acts of torture and attach appropriate penalties for such acts, and that each state 
party’s legal system must ensure that torture victims have an enforceable right to compensation); 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. VIII, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 
(entered into force Dec. 9, 1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention] (empowering a state party to call 
upon the United Nations to take action for the prevention and suppression of genocide); Protocol for 
the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods 
of Warfare ¶ 2, June 17, 1925, 26 U.N.T.S. 571 (committing states parties to induce other nations to 
accede to the Gas Protocol). 
 103. ICCPR, supra note 70. 
 104. Id. art. 6, ¶ 1. 
 105. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6, Article 6 (16th Sess.) U.N. Doc. 
HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1, ¶ 1 (1982) [hereinafter HRC on ICCPR Art. 6]. 
 106. ICCPR, supra note 73, art. 4, ¶ 2. 
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understood as integral to all human rights and “should not be interpreted 
narrowly.”107 Mass atrocities kill people in violation of Article 6. As the 
HRC put it: “[A]cts of mass violence continue to be a scourge of humanity 
and take the lives of thousands of innocent human beings every year.”108 
Those facts, said the HRC, impose “the supreme duty to prevent” acts of 
“genocide and other acts of mass violence causing arbitrary loss of life.”109 
Though treaty monitoring committee pronouncements are non-binding soft 
law, they are nonetheless deemed weighty and authoritative.110 That is 
because the pronouncements are interpretations by committee members 
who are chosen for their expertise in the subject matter of the treaty and 
who are presumably more knowledgeable about the treaty’s terms than 
virtually anyone else.111 
Informed by this HRC interpretation, the legal argument of interest is 
that when violations of ICCPR Article 6 are caused by mass atrocities, that 
provision should be liberally read so as to implicitly give rise to a peoples’ 
right to stop the atrocities, i.e., the flip side of the human rights law duty to 
stop the atrocities enunciated by the HRC; and, when mass atrocities can 
only be stopped by collective armed intervention, there should be further 
inferred from Article 6 a peoples’ right to U.N. armed intervention to halt 
them. Otherwise, the right to life is delusory when it is being most 
outrageously and rampantly defied. International law scholars have used 
similar reasoning in predicating a human right to peace on the ICCPR’s 
right to life.112 
The Covenant contains additional provisions also bearing on protection 
 
 
 107. HRC on ICCPR Art. 6, supra note101, at ¶¶ 1–2, 5. 
 108. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 599, 601 (2005) 
(stating that monitoring committee treaty interpretations can be authoritative, especially in the human 
rights area); Yuji Iwasawa, The Domestic Impact of International Human Rights Standards: The 
Japanese Experience, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 245, 258–59 
(Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000) (averring that soft law, such as treaty monitoring 
committee pronouncements, carry “great weight”). 
 111. ICCPR, supra note 73, art. 28, ¶¶ 1–2. In general, monitoring committee interpretations of 
treaties may be gradually moving towards more of a hard-law status because an increasing amount of 
“lawmaking” in the human rights area is occurring through this means. See ALVAREZ, supra note 110, 
at 506–07, 596, 599–601. This movement is happening regardless of the fact that article 38 the Statute 
of the International Court of Justice does not enumerate such interpretations as a source of hard 
international law. Id. at 505. 
 112. A.A. Tikhonov, The Interrelationship Between the Right to Life and the Right to Peace, in 
THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 103 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985); Schabas, infra note 
140, at 48; Alfred de Zayas, Peace as a Human Right: The Jus Cogens Prohibition of Aggression, in 
MAKING PEOPLES HEARD: ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONOUR OF GUDMUNDUR ALFREDSSON 27, 
37 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 2011). 
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of human life and physical integrity. Notably, Article 7 states, in pertinent 
part, that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”113 It is tautological to assert that mass 
atrocities inflict, not only loss of life, but torture or other gross 
mistreatment of the victims.114 By analogy, it is as strong an argument to 
deduce the proposed armed intervention right from Article 7 as it is from 
Article 6, when mass atrocity is the culprit. 
Perhaps even more to the point is the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide115 (“Genocide Convention”), a 
treaty which is classified as part of IHRL, though it “draws upon” 
international humanitarian law (“IHL”).116 The Convention creates a duty 
committing states parties to prevent and punish genocide,117 and gives 
them authority to call upon the U.N. “to take such action under the Charter 
. . . as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts 
of genocide.”118 (Emphasis added.) Some commentators have persuasively 
argued that, given the odiousness of genocide, these two provisions 
amount to a duty to “call in the troops.”119 In any event, acts of genocide 
are typically perpetrated through mass atrocities; prevention and 
suppression of such acts may therefore involve calling upon the U.N., 
when peaceful options will not work, to militarily intervene for those 
purposes. Hence, the Genocide Convention authorizes exactly the same 
U.N. armed intervention which the proposed peoples’ right does, except 
that the Convention limits intervention to the genocidal, while the peoples’ 
right aims to stop both genocidal mass atrocities and those arising from 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. Deducing the 
right from the aforesaid treaty duty probably stands on the most cogent 
ground of all under IHRL. 
Finally, the concept of erga omnes should also serve to support the 
 
 
 113. ICCPR, supra note 73, art. 7. 
 114. The reference to “torture” in the text above is intended to signify “torture” as the word is 
understood in the ICCPR rather than as set forth in article 1 of the Torture Convention. 
 115. Genocide Convention, supra note 98. 
 116. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 5-6 
(2000). 
 117. Genocide Convention, supra note 102, art. I. 
 118. Id. art. VIII. 
 119. Gassama, supra note 1, at 732–34; cf. Stephen J. Toope, Does International Law Impose a 
Duty Upon the UN to Prevent Genocide?, 46 MCGILL L.J. 187, 192–94 (2000) (positing that both 
states parties to the Genocide Convention and the United Nations have a duty to prevent genocide, 
based on the Convention’s articles I and VIII, and implying that such “prevention” may occur when a 
genocide is already in progress); but see Alex J. Bellamy & Ruben Reike, The Responsibility to 
Protect and International Law, 2 GLOBAL RESP. PROTECT 267, 283–84 (2010) (opining that the 
“majority view” is that the Genocide Convention does not give rise to a duty to intervene to prevent or 
stop genocide). 
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proposed peoples’ right as a constituent of present-day IHRL. The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) first advanced the concept of erga 
omnes as a dictum in the Barcelona Traction case,120 defining it as 
“obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole” 
such that “all states can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection.”121 The opinion further descries erga omnes in “the principles 
and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person.”122 The Court 
specified that the sources of erga omnes rights are to be found in either 
customary international law or “international instruments of a universal of 
quasi-universal character.”123 
The prohibitions on taking human life and on genocide are customary 
international law and124 necessarily bear on the “basic rights of the human 
person”125 inasmuch as violation of the prohibitions destroys human life. 
These prohibitions therefore must be erga omnes.126 Indeed, the Barcelona 
Traction case virtually acknowledges that conclusion by stating that 
prohibitions on acts of aggression and genocide are exemplars of erga 
omnes.127 Since mass atrocities take human life and, if accompanied by the 
requisite persecutory intent, both take human life and perpetrate genocide, 
prohibitions on mass atrocities must be erga omnes elements of customary 
international law. 
Analysis based on treaty law is different but yields the same outcome. 
It has been said that the “legal regime governing obligations erga omnes 
partes first and foremost depends on the express or implied terms of the 
 
 
 120. Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belgium v. Spain), Second 
Phase, [1970] I.C.J. Rep. 3, at 32 ¶¶ 33–34 [hereinafter Barcelona Traction Case]. 
 121. Id. ¶ 33. 
 122. Id. ¶ 34. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See W. Paul Gormley, The Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability: Peremptory 
Norms of Jus Cogens, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120, 122 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 
1985) (referring to the right to life as customary international law); JENNY GROTE STOUTENBERG, 
DISAPPEARING ISLAND STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 347 (2015) (contending that the right to life is 
not only customary international law, but that it has also attained the status of jus cogens); Richard L. 
Herz, Litigating Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 40 
VA. J. INT’L LAW 545, 575–76 (2000) (observing that the right to life is customary international law); 
BOLESLAW ADAM BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DICTIONARY 164 (2005) (declaring that the 
prohibition on genocide is customary international law); Michael P. Scharf & Margaux Day, The Ad 
Hoc Criminal Tribunals: Launching a New Era of Accountability, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 51, 55 (William A. Schabas & Nadia Bernazeds., 2011) (describing 
that a decision by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia characterized the 
prohibition on genocide as jus cogens). 
 125. Barcelona Traction Case, supra note 120, at ¶ 34. 
 126. CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 120 
(2005). 
 127. Barcelona Traction Case, supra note 120, at ¶ 34. 
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treaty of which they form part.”128 Accordingly, an implied treaty term 
may be erga omnes partes. Whether an implied right legitimately arises 
from the express terms of a treaty is a matter of treaty interpretation 
governed by the Vienna Convention,129 and the Convention, it will be 
remembered, directs that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith” 
concordant with the terms’ “ordinary meaning” in light of the treaty’s 
“object and purpose.”130 Because the above-described express treaty 
prohibitions on extinguishing human life and on genocide would be absurd 
unless they encompassed an implied prohibition on mass atrocities, and 
given that these treaties’ overriding purpose is protection of human rights, 
the prohibitions must be erga omnes partes as well as erga omnes. 
At this juncture, it may fairly be asked how the erga omnes status of 
the right to life and of interdiction on genocide and, by necessary 
inference, the erga omnes status of the prohibition on mass atrocities, has 
any connection to this Article’s proposal for recognition of a peoples’ right 
to U.N. armed intervention to stop mass atrocities. The answer may be 
found in the scholarly literature advocating a legal duty to enforce erga 
omnes obligations.131 A number of commentators have asserted that 
enforcement may include military force.132 Most relevant, a few have 
 
 
 128. See TAMS, supra note 126, at 125 (emphasis added). 
 129. Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31, ¶ 1. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See, e.g., International Committee of the Red Cross, Rule 144: Ensuring Respect for 
International Humanitarian Law Erga Omnes, ICRC.ORG,  https://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule144 (reciting the ICRC rule providing, in part, that states must exert their 
influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of international humanitarian law which are all 
“norms erga omnes”); James Bacchus, The Garden, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 308, 331–32 (observing 
that erga omnes norms impose duties to enforce the same); Toope, supra note 115, at 193–94 (2000) 
(arguing that the Security Council has a duty to prevent genocide, an erga omnes crime); Christopher 
P. DeNicola, Comments, A Shield for the “Knights of Humanity”: The ICC Should Adopt a 
Humanitarian Necessity Defense to the Crime of Aggression, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 641, 658–59 (2008) 
(noting that some pundits urge that there is an erga omnes obligation to intervene militarily to stop 
massive human rights abuses); Amnesty International, Chapter Five: Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty 
of States to Enact and Enforce Legislation, at 13-14 https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ 
ior53/008/2001/en/ (analyzing that because the prohibition on crimes against humanity is jus cogens 
and erga omnes, there is a duty to extradite or try persons suspected of their perpetration); M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 63, 63 (Autumn 1996) (positing that, with respect to international crimes which are obligato 
erga omnes, there are multiple duties including duties to prosecute, extradite, suspend applicable 
statutes of limitations, and to exercise universal jurisdiction over perpetrators); cf. Peter Hilpold, 
Humanitarian Intervention: Is There a Need for a Legal Reappraisal?, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 437, 453 
(2001) (opining that an erga omnes obligation under international humanitarian law could give rise to 
a duty on the part of states to engage in humanitarian intervention, but that making states the duty-
holders would be illegal). 
 132. See Jost Delbrück, The Impact of the Allocation of International Law Enforcement Authority 
on the International Legal Order, in ALLOCATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 135, 152–53 (Jost Delbrück & Ursula E. Heinz eds., 1995) (maintaining that 
there is no basis in the U.N. Charter for denying that “states are bound to participate in forcible 
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posited that the existence of erga omnes human rights concomitantly 
creates a duty to intervene militarily to “prevent massive violations of 
human rights.”133 Based on the familiar axiom that where there is a duty, 
there is a right to have that duty fulfilled (and vice versa),134 there may 
logically be inferred from that duty an erga omnes peoples’ right to armed 
intervention to stop mass atrocities. 
The erga omnes line of argument, it must be conceded, is not the 
sturdiest foundation for recognition of the proposed peoples’ right. To 
begin with, the ICJ’s creation of the erga omnes doctrine is a dictum the 
meaning of which is not at all certain.135 Most of the scholarship about the 
dictum has confined discussion to the duty/right of nations, not of peoples 
or of the United Nations, to enforce erga omnes human rights.136 And, 
there is scholarship repudiating any positive duty to enforce as arising 
from the doctrine,137 let alone a peoples’ right of the sort described here. 
 
 
collective action . . . as decided by the Security Council” to enforce erga omnes norms); TAMS, supra 
note 126, at 9 (remarking that international law scholar W. Michael Reisman has identified military 
intervention as a primary means for enforcing some erga omnes human rights norms); DeNicola, supra 
note 131, at 658–59 (referring to commentators who hold that there is an erga omnes obligation to 
intervene militarily to stop larger-scale human rights violations); cf. CARL WELLMAN, THE MORAL 
DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 122–23 (2011) (suggesting that it is unsettled in international law 
whether states may use military force if the latter has not been authorized by the U.N. Security 
Council). 
 133. See Toope, supra note 119, at 193–94 (asserting that the U.N. Security Council may have a 
duty to enforce erga omnes prohibitions on genocide, including enforcement by “use of force”); cf. 
Hilpold, supra note 131, at 453 (offering that a legal duty to use humanitarian intervention to enforce 
ergo omnes obligations “could” exist); DeNicola, supra note 131, at 658-59 (mentioning that the 
Genocide Convention creates an erga omnes obligation to intervene militarily to prevent mass 
atrocities, and stating that some authorities seek “to extend this duty to other atrocities”). 
 134. See Samantha Besson, The Legitimate Authority of International Human Rights, in THE 
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES: LEGAL, POLITICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 32, 75 (Andreas Føllesdal et al. eds., 2014) (describing international human rights as 
having “corresponding duties”); John Henry Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 163, 171 n.30 (2009) (stating that all human rights treaties impose duties); Jordan J. Paust, 
The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51, 56-62 
(1992) (seeing private and state duties as the “other side of right”).  
 135. TAMS, supra note 126, at 100; WOUTER G. WERNER, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DISCOURSE, in GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 125, 142 
(Ige F. Dekker & Wouter G. Werner eds., 2004). 
 136. See, e.g., ANDRÉ DE HOOGH, OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: A 
THEORETICAL INQUIRY INTO THE IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES passim (1996); GLEIDER I. HERNÁNDEZ, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION 227 (2014) (averring that the ICJ “clearly set erga omnes 
obligations within the traditional State-centric framework”); but see DARAGH MURRAY, HUMAN 
RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS 146 (2016) (contending that when states cannot 
live up to obligations erga omnes, “the international legal order must intervene”). 
 137. See, e.g., ISABELLA D. BUNN, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW: LEGAL AND MORAL DIMENSIONS 137 (2012) (pointing out that, as articulated in the 
Barcelona Traction case, erga omnes obligations were first conceived as negative in nature); cf. 3 
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The infirmities of the erga omnes argument must not, however, be 
understood to in any way undermine the more general legal argument 
otherwise advanced in this Part III.1.138 The latter’s reliance on 
commonplace legal analysis to deduce the peoples’ right from more 
established human rights, stands completely on its own and without need 
of erga omnes reasoning. Indeed, I wrestled with whether to skip erga 
omnes altogether out of concern that the doctrine’s presence would hurt 
rather than help the general argument, as a weak secondary theory may 
sometimes do. Nonetheless, on balance, it seemed worth the risk. At a 
minimum the erga omnes construct conveys the sacrosanctity of the 
prohibitions on taking life and on genocide, and the imperativeness of 
suppressing mass atrocities by providing a mechanism, like the proposed 
peoples’ right, to reliably stop them.  
 
 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 13 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2008) 
(stating that it is unsettled in international law as to whether ergo omnes doctrine imposes a right or a 
duty of enforcement). 
 138. See supra notes 97-115 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
272 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 16:245 
 
 
 
 
2. Interconnection Between the Peoples’ Right and Solidarity Human 
Rights 
IHRL has often been thought of as divided into three non-hierarchical 
groups, called “generations,” of rights. First-generation rights are civil and 
political; second-generation rights are social, economic, and cultural; and 
third-generation rights, also called “solidarity rights,” are those 
distinguished as collectively held and collectively fulfilled.139 The term 
“generation” is not meant to denote sets of rights successively superseding 
each other as happens over time in the plant and animal world; the three 
generations of human rights are conceived instead as coexisting with each 
other. 
a. Intermezzo: Nature and Legal Status of Solidarity Rights 
Solidarity rights are of particular interest to this Article. They include 
the right to peace,140 the right to development,141 and the right to a healthy 
or clean environment.142 Though solidarity rights-holders are cohorts of 
 
 
 139. ANTHONY E. CASSIMATIS, HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED TRADE MEASURES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE LEGALITY OF TRADE MEASURES IMPOSED IN RESPONSE TO VIOLATIONS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS UNDER GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 40, n.101 (2007); Stephen P. 
Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s? 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 441 
(1981); Carl Wellman, Solidarity Rights, the Individual and Human Rights, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 639, 641 
(2000); Jason Morgan-Foster, Third Generation Rights: What Islamic Law Can Teach the 
International Human Rights Movement, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 67, 84–89 (2005) (adding a 
caveat that solidarity rights contain an individual-duty component); Natsu Taylor Saito, Beyond Civil 
Rights: Considering “Third Generation” International Human Rights Law in the United States, 28 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 387, 395–96 (1997). 
 140. See DOUGLAS ROCHE, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PEACE 122–43 (2003) (making a persuasive 
case for the existence of a solidarity right to peace, though characterizing the right as “newly 
emerging”); Marks, supra note 139, at 445-46 (characterizing the solidarity right to peace as “one of 
the emerging rights of the 1980s”); William A. Schabas, The Human Right to Peace, in MAKING 
PEOPLES HEARD: ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN HONOR OF GUDMUNDUR ALFREDSSON 43, 43-48 
(Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter PEOPLES HEARD] (presenting a compelling argument that 
the solidarity right to peace exists); de Zayas, supra note 108, at 27, 37–40 (calling the third-
generation human right to peace hard international law of “paramount” importance); Adam Lopatka, 
The Right to Live in Peace as a Human Right, 11 SECURITY DIALOGUE 361, 365 (1980) (averring that 
the third-generation solidarity right to peace “[t]oday . . . is a law proclaimed by the UN” but is “not 
yet an internationally and legally established human right”); Philip Alston, Peace as a Human Right, 
11 SECURITY DIALOGUE 319, 325, 328 (1980) (claiming that there is a human right to peace under 
international law, but expressing concern that the right’s content had then not been fully defined).   
 141. Marks, supra note 139, at 444–45; Sohn, supra note 93, at 52–56. 
 142. Johan D. van der Vyver, The Environment: State Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Armed 
Conflict, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 85, 93–94 (2009); see Jennifer A. Downs, Note, A Healthy and 
Ecologically Balanced Environment: An Argument for a Third Generation Right, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 351, 376–78 (1993) (arguing for a third-generation right to a healthy and ecologically 
balanced environment). 
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people, the rights may also be concurrently held on an individual basis.143 
One analyst rather neatly dissected the intrinsic duality: “because 
collective rights are always ultimately destined for individuals, they are 
[also] ipso facto . . . individual rights.”144 Be that as it may, such rights-
holders’ juristic twin—the entities that are duty-bound to fulfill a 
solidarity right—must function in groups too, e.g., groups of countries, 
IGOs, and perhaps of other global or regional actors. A consortium of such 
respondents is, in each case, necessitated by the fact that rights of this ilk 
involve problems no single nation or individual actor has the capability of 
resolving alone.145 
However, a threshold question remains as to whether solidarity rights 
are yet part of the canon of IHRL. A circle of eminent scholars on the 
subject are confident that solidarity rights are already extant legal rights.146 
Other experts maintain that solidarity rights are presently more in the 
nature of aspirations or moral pronouncements than of legal rights;147 
some of the latter offer as a rationale for this view that solidarity rights are 
not set forth in treaty form.148 In between these two camps is still another 
which describes solidarity rights as “emerging” international legal 
rights.149 
The first camp is easily the most persuasive. Decisive to this 
assessment is Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice,150 which enumerates the valid sources of international law: 
 
 
 143. Compare de Zayas, supra note 112, at 40 (observing that the solidarity right to peace is 
exercised both individually and collectively) and Sohn, supra note 93, at 48, 58 (same), with Wellman, 
supra note 139, at 644 (alleging that solidarity rights are not individual rights). 
 144. Subrata Roy Chowdhury, Intergenerational Equity: Substratum of the Right to Sustainable 
Development, in THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 233, 246 (Subrata Roy 
Chowdhury et al., eds. 1992). 
 145. Roche, supra note 140, at 134; Marks, supra note 139, at 441. 
 146. See, e.g., Sohn, supra note 93, at 57 (respecting the right to peace); Schabas, supra note 140, 
at 43–48 (regarding the right to peace); de Zayas, supra note 112, at 37–40 (concerning the right to 
peace); Alston, supra note 140, at 328 (regarding the right to peace). 
 147. See, e.g., Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: 
ISSUES AND ACTION 14, 19-20 (Richard Pierre Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 1992) (asserting that 
the majority of solidarity rights tend to be aspirational rather than juridical); Rebecca J. Cook, U.S. 
Population Policy, Sex Discrimination, and Principles of Equality Under International Law, 20 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L & POL. 93, 115 (1987) (same). 
 148. See, e.g., Lopatka, supra note 140, at 365 (arguing that the right to peace must be the subject 
of a treaty in order to become a “legally established human right”). 
 149. See, e.g., Roche, supra note 140, at 136 (referring to “newly emerging” third-generation 
rights); Marks, supra note 139, at 442–52 (characterizing a host of solidarity rights as “emerging”); 
A.A. Tikhonov, The Inter-relationship Between the Right to Life and the Right to Peace; Nuclear 
Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass-Destruction and the Right to Life, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 98–99 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985) (referring to the right to peace as in 
“progressive development”). 
 150. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 
993. 
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treaties, customary international law, general principles of law recognized 
by civilized nations, judicial decisions, and “teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations,” the last two sources 
constituting a “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”151 
Solidarity rights are not, to date, customary international law.152 But, 
the ones specified above are indisputably treaty law.153 The solidarity 
rights to peace, economic development, and a healthy environment are 
expressly stated in major regional human rights treaties as well as in 
certain other multilateral treaties. For instance, the solidarity rights to 
peace, development, and an acceptable environment are all explicitly 
embraced in at least one major regional treaty, i.e., the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights,154 and the solidarity right to development is 
also clearly contained in the multilateral International Labour 
Organization’s Convention No. 169.155 The foregoing instruments are 
binding treaties and the aforementioned solidarity rights are 
unambiguously set forth in them. It is thus plainly erroneous to claim that 
such rights cannot yet be part of IHRL because they are supposedly not in 
treaties. 
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that solidarity rights are also 
recognized as extant international legal rights by, as we have seen, 
publications of some of the “most highly qualified” international law 
scholars.156 Further, some solidarity rights are recognized by judicial 
decision.157 The European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”), 
arguably the world’s most prestigious international human rights court, 
has ruled that the right to a healthy environment is, in effect, implied in 
Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention”).158 Article 8, 
paragraph 1 provides that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”159 In Dubetska 
and Others v. Ukraine, the applicants complained of a violation of this 
 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. See, e.g., Downs, supra note 142, at 375 (stating that the solidarity right to a healthy 
environment does not qualify as customary international law). 
 153. See infra notes 153-68 and accompanying text. 
 154. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, arts. 22–24, adopted on June 27, 
1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). 
 155. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries art. 7, ¶¶ 1-
2, adopted on June 1, 1989, 72 ILO Official Bull. 59 (entered into force Sept. 5, 1991). 
 156. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 157. See infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text. 
 158. European Convention, supra note 71, art. 8, ¶ 1. 
 159. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss2/5
 
 
 
 
 
2017] FOR RECOGNITION OF A PEOPLES’ RIGHT 275 
 
 
 
 
article due to a coal mine and factory operating near their residence, 
producing pollution levels which damaged applicants’ health, living 
environment, and home.160 The Court reiterated its established 
jurisprudence that “an arguable claim under Article 8 may arise where an 
environmental hazard attains a level of severity resulting in significant 
impairment of the applicant’s ability to enjoy his home, private or family 
life.”161 The Court applied this principle in Dubetska to hold that the 
government’s failure to rectify the applicants’ situation violated Article 
8.162  
Likewise, the European Court has repeatedly ruled that various warlike 
acts committed during armed conflict, i.e., acts which are necessarily the 
antithesis of peace, constitute violations of European Convention 
provisions.163 Just one of many examples is Benzer and Others v. Turkey, 
where applicants alleged that the Turkish military bombed their villages 
by aircraft so as to kill more than 30 of their close relatives, to physically 
injure some of the applicants, and to destroy most of their property and 
livestock.164 The Court held, among other things, that the bombing 
violated European Convention Article 2 (right to life)165 and Article 3 
(prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment).166 Though the Court did 
not specifically discuss a human right to peace, the ruling that certain acts 
of war contravene these Convention provisions leads to an inevitable 
inference that applicants possessed a human right to be free of those acts. 
Support for the inference is contained in the Court’s expatiation on the 
 
 
 160. Dubetska v. Ukraine, App. No. 30499/03, ¶¶ 24–30 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-103273. 
 161. Id. at ¶ 105. 
 162. Id. at ¶¶ 109–23, 146–56. 
 163. See, e.g., Tangiyeva v. Russia, App. No. 57935/00, ¶¶ 8–22, 96–101 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2007), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-83578 (finding a substantive violation of European Convention 
article 2’s protection of the right to life, caused by armed conflict resulting in shooting deaths); 
Esmukhambetov v. Russia, App. No. 23445/03, ¶¶ 150–51, 191 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104159 [hereinafter Esmukhambetov] (finding substantive 
violation of European Convention article 2 as well as violation of Convention article 3’s prohibition on 
inhuman treatment, due to killings from indiscriminate bombings during armed conflict); Benzer v. 
Turkey, App. No. 23502/06, ¶¶ 7–19, 176–85, 209, 212–13 (Eur. Ct. H.R.) (2013), 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-128036 [hereinafter Benzer] (holding that Turkey substantively 
violated article 2 of the European Convention by killing applicants’ close relatives through aerial 
bombardments, and also holding that Turkey violated article 3 of the Convention by bombing 
applicants’ homes so as to render them uninhabitable), judgment revised on other grounds, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-150231. 
 164. Benzer, supra note 163, at ¶¶ 7-19. 
 165. Id. at ¶¶ 176–85 (ruling that the bombing constituted a substantive violation of European 
Convention article 2). 
 166. Id. at ¶¶ 209, 212–13 (judging that it violated article 3 of the European Convention for 
government bombing to cause applicants to witness the violent deaths of close relatives and to collect 
and bury the remains of those victims). 
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legal principles governing Articles 2 and 3 in this context. The Benzer 
Court supplemented Article 2 with principles from the laws of war, 
announcing that use of force must be “strictly proportionate” to achieving 
any legal goals167 and that accountability may attach for unintentional as 
well as intentional killings.168 Similarly, the Court had no trouble finding 
that aerial bombing of applicants’ residences so as to leave them homeless, 
a common part of war, was inhuman treatment contravening Article 3.169 
The Court’s application of IHL governing armed conflict and its 
conclusions that discrete acts of war fit within the prohibitions of Articles 
2 and 3, amounts to tacit recognition of applicants’ implied solidarity right 
to peace under the European Convention. 
In sum, the solidarity rights to peace, development, and a healthy 
environment are either set forth in treaties; recognized by the most highly 
esteemed international law experts and international courts; or all of the 
above. The outcome is that, as per the standards of Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, these solidarity rights are 
IHRL.  
It may be some added comfort to any doubting Thomases that the 
bigger picture is as consistent with this conclusion as the analytical 
minutiae. It is myopic to the point of distortion to regard human rights as 
static over time or as rigidly compartmentalized. Human rights law is 
kinetic; it tends to respond with new protections to new historical events 
and to humankind’s expanding knowledge.170 For example, the 
contemporary inception of this body of law was, in large part, a response 
to the atrocities of the Holocaust and World War II.171 Moreover, human 
rights are kinetic in relation to each other, operating interdependently and 
reciprocally vis-à-vis development of their content.172 Solidarity rights, 
 
 
 167. Benzer, supra note 163, at ¶ 163. 
 168. Id. at ¶ 184. 
 169. Id. at ¶ 212. 
 170. See Marks, supra note 139, at 436 (referring to the “dynamic aspect of human rights . . . in 
international law”); Scott Sheeran & Sir Nigel Rodley, The Broad Review of International Human 
Rights Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 3, 3 (Scott Sheeran 
& Sir Nigel Rodley eds., 2013) (describing international human rights law as dynamic and marked by 
impressive growth); CRISTINA GABRIELA BADESCU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 33 (commenting that the “international 
human rights regime has grown in width and depth” and is evolving); cf. Sohn, supra note 93, at 1–6 
(tracing some of the developments in international human rights law over time). 
 171. University of Minnesota, Human Rights Here and Now: Celebrating the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Part 1: Human Rights Fundamentals, A Short History of Human Rights 
(Nancy Flowers ed.), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-1/short-
history.htm.  
 172. Sohn, supra note 93, at 62–63. 
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building on the right to life, etc., partake of this shared ontogeny.  
b. Correspondence Between the Peoples’ Right and the Solidarity 
Rights Category 
Having defined the category of solidarity rights and confirmed the 
existence of at least three of them as law, the question next arises 
concerning whether a peoples’ right to U.N. armed intervention to stop 
mass atrocities, should be among their number. The constitutive attributes 
of this right, as conceived here, are on all fours with the constitutive 
attributes of solidarity rights in general. That is, the holders of the 
proposed right would be any group of people subjected or imminently 
about to be subjected to mass atrocity;173 and the group would seek 
cessation of the atrocity, or of its commencement, through the remedy of 
armed concerted action authorized by the U.N.174  
At first glance, casting the U.N. in the role of duty-holder may seem to 
ignore the solidarity rights paradigm as entailing fulfillment by the 
cooperative actions of multiple actors, i.e., assemblages of nations, IGOs, 
NGOs, and/or individuals.175 The divergence, though, is one of degree 
rather than kind. The duty-bearer regarding this right is, after all, an IGO 
whose membership consists of almost all of the world’s countries.176  
It may also be objected that none of the three major solidarity rights 
discussed earlier explicitly name a mandated means for their fulfillment 
while the right proposed in this Article unequivocally does so in calling 
for U.N. armed intervention.177 But, does this dissimilarity make the new 
right inappropriate for inclusion among solidarity rights? The answer must 
be no. By definition, the three major solidarity rights—to peace, economic 
development, and a healthy environment—do prescribe means of 
fulfillment insofar as they each require collectives to fulfill the rights.178  
An additional snag in trying to slot the proposed right under the 
solidarity rights rubric might be the fact that fulfillment of the former 
would entail the use of force, i.e., U.N. or U.N. authorized military 
intervention. None of the aforementioned three solidarity rights demands 
 
 
 173. The proposal in the text above is my own original invention.  
 174. The proposal in the text above is my own original invention. 
 175. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 176. As of December 2015, member countries of the United Nations numbered 193. See GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, www.un.org/en/ga/#. 
 177. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text; see infra notes 177-80 and accompanying 
text.  
 178. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
278 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 16:245 
 
 
 
 
this form of relief,179 and it may seem that the solidarity right to peace, in 
particular, should contraindicate any right to humanitarian intervention by 
blue-helmet attack. Nevertheless, things are not always what they seem. It 
should be noted that, overall, “human rights law has never been pacifistic, 
in the sense of a principled and intransigent opposition to the use of force 
under all circumstances.”180 The wisdom of this insight is borne out by 
simple logic because armed force is not always and intrinsically 
destructive of peace. Instead, the relation of armed force to peace depends 
on the purpose for which the force is deployed, and that purpose is 
quintessentially a political and moral decision. In other words, the gun 
may either enable the dove or hunt it down. While the historical instances 
of armed force enabling peace do not overwhelm, that they exist at all 
makes the point.181 
This more pragmatic approach of making a military solution the 
sometime surety for peace, is on conspicuous display in international law. 
We need look no further than the U.N. Charter’s Article 42 which 
empowers the Security Council, under certain conditions, to “take . . . 
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”182 U.N. armed intervention is 
linguistically and substantively subsumed by Article 42’s language, and 
the Security Council has repeatedly acted upon that assumption.183 
It turns out that, on closer inspection, there is really nothing heterodox 
or contradictory about enrolling in the solidarity rights roster a peoples’ 
right to U.N. armed intervention to stop mass atrocities. That it is so, 
however, does not yet deal with the issue of whether there are acceptable 
legal foundations for the right—a subject which this Article now directly 
addresses. 
c. The Peoples’ Right Is Implicit in the Solidarity Right to Peace 
 
 
 179. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 180. Schabas, supra note 140, at 50. 
 181. For example, today’s relative peace in the Balkans undoubtedly was facilitated by NATO’s 
use of armed force in the then roiling region. NATO’s Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, 
NATO, www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm. 
 182. U.N. Charter, supra note 31, art. 42. 
 183. See, e.g., Council on Foreign Relations, CFR Backgrounders, www.cfr.org/international-
organizations-and-alliances/un-security-council-unsc/p31649 (noting that the Security Council has 
authorized 51 peacekeeping operations since the Cold War’s end, and that some of those with “more 
muscular mandates” have “combined military operations—including less restrictive rules of 
engagement that allow for civilian and refugee protection”; and, noting further that increasingly the 
Council has authorized use of force by regional organizations for humanitarian purposes). 
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As discussed previously, there is no intrinsic antithesis between the 
right to peace and a right to armed intervention to stop mass atrocities. At 
least in the present era, armed force is sometimes the only way to a peace 
which would otherwise be impossible. That on too many occasions armed 
force has failed to achieve this objective speaks only to shortcomings in 
implementation, not to the potential instrumentality of arms in aid of 
peace.184 The analytical takeaway, in legal terms, is that when mass 
atrocity has commenced or is about to commence and non-violent 
deterrence is of no avail, then there must be an implied right to such armed 
intervention; otherwise, peace will be unattainable at the very moment 
when attainment is most essential. Thus, using standard deductive 
methodology, there is a bona fide legal basis for recognizing that the 
human right to peace inferentially gives rise to a right to U.N. armed 
intervention to stop mass atrocities, i.e., to maintain peace in violent 
situations where there are no non-violent solutions. 
This interpretation of solidarity rights and particularly the solidarity 
right to peace is, I think, a development whose time has come. Though the 
proposed peoples’ right to armed intervention has not received much of a 
hearing in scholarly legal literature, a lone commentator or two has used 
the argot of solidarity rights in hovering around the concept. In an article 
about an alleged nascent right to humanitarian assistance for purposes of 
restoring democracy, Lois Fielding claims that the United Nations’ right 
and duty to provide armed humanitarian assistance to stop atrocities “is 
based in the strength of the solidarity of humanity”;185 elsewhere in the 
article she refers to the “right of a population to be free from internal as 
well as external aggression.”186 It is intriguing that, if she had considered 
these two rights in direct interrelationship with each other, a variation on 
the peoples’ solidarity right to U.N. armed intervention to stop mass 
atrocities theoretically might have resulted. 
B. Bases in Jus In Bello, i.e., in International Humanitarian Law 
Jus in bello (“international humanitarian law” or “IHL”) and IHRL are 
separate bodies of international law (though they have recently begun to 
 
 
 184. The paradigmatic case is when U.N. peacekeepers were unable to stop genocide in 1994 
Rwanda because of initial limits on the scope of the mission and a shocking shortfall in troops and 
matériel. DALLAIRE, supra note 20, at 41–42, 207–08. 
 185. Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The 
Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 329, 
355 (1995). 
 186. Id. at 330. 
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merge in some respects).187 IHL applies only in times of armed conflict, 
IHRL applies during both war and peace.188 Jus in bello protects only 
limited classes of people during armed conflict, i.e., people who are not or 
are no longer participating in hostilities. These consist of sick, wounded 
and shipwrecked persons not taking part in hostilities, prisoners of war and 
other detainees, and civilians.189 IHRL, in contrast, protects all people. 
Thus, members of the IHL cohorts are rights-holders under jus in bello 
while every individual is a rights-holder under IHRL.190  
It is my contention that IHL should implicitly give rise to a peoples’ 
right to U.N. armed intervention to stop mass atrocities just as IHRL does. 
As early as 1981, Professor Stephen Marks asserted that, the “right to 
humanitarian assistance already exist[ed] as a legal right in international 
humanitarian law.”191 The law review article containing this statement 
does not expressly refer to “armed” assistance, but it also does not 
expressly exclude use of physical force in aid of saving people from 
“death on a wide scale.” As authority for the assertion, the article cites the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949192 and their Additional Protocols,193 
providing for the care of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked, prisoners of 
war, and civilians. Marks stressed that the Conventions’ rights to such care 
are absolute, so much so that the beneficiaries cannot renounce them.194 
While he took the position that the rights under these instruments must be 
fulfilled by states parties, he extrapolated that the “idea of a right to 
international humanitarian assistance would go beyond these instruments, 
while incorporating certain provisions of them.”195 This is an arresting 
analysis; it is but the tiniest of steps from this analytical foothold to the 
conclusion that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols, 
 
 
 187. Orna Ben-Naftali, Introduction: International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law—Pas de Deux, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW PAS DE DEUX 3, 4 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011). 
 188. International Committee of the Red Cross, IHL and Human Rights, 
https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/ihl-other-legal-regimies/ihl-human-rights. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Paola Gaeta, Are Victims of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Entitled to 
Compensation?, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
PAS DE DEUX 305, 318 (Orna Ben-Haftali ed., 2011). 
 191. Marks, supra note 139, at 449–50. 
 192. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
art. 7, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3115, T.I.A.S. No. 3362. 
 193. International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Added to the Geneva Convention of 
Aug. 12, 1949, at 11, 95 (1977). 
 194. Marks, supra note 139, at 450. 
 195. Id; see Sohn, supra note 93, at 60. 
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central components of IHL, implicitly give rise to the proposed peoples’ 
right to U.N. armed intervention to stop mass atrocities. 
C. Bases in Jus Ad Bellum 
Jus ad bellum is the third area of international law which may serve as 
a legal underpinning for a peoples’ right to U.N. armed intervention to 
stop mass atrocities. Jus ad bellum is the law governing the reasons for 
going to war, and the U.N. Charter is the source of that law.196 Under jus 
ad bellum aggressive use of armed force is forbidden.197 This prohibition 
is jus cogens, a preemptory norm which can only be overridden by a 
contrary jus cogens norm.198 There are, generally speaking, five types of 
aggressive attacks which run afoul of the prohibition: full-scale invasion, 
secret warfare (indirect aggression), creation of a parallel state within a 
state, terrorism, and indiscriminate mining of international waterways.199 
As the enumeration implies, jus ad bellum does not impose a total ban on 
all use of armed force.200 Modern jus ad bellum excludes from the 
prohibition self-defense and the use of armed force under the Security 
Council’s Chapter VII powers.201 
It is the latter powers which are germane here. One is Security Council 
authorization of armed force in accordance with the prerequisites of 
Charter Articles 39 and 42, i.e., there must be a threat to peace, breach of 
peace, or act of aggression, and measures not involving use of armed force 
would be inadequate or have been proven so.202 Article 42 additionally 
describes the purpose for which authorized armed force may be deployed: 
to maintain or restore international peace and security.203 Though this is 
the sole permissible purpose, the statement of it leaves ambiguities. Does 
Article 42, for example and most pertinently, countenance U.N. armed 
interventions to stop mass atrocities? 
The answer requires not only scrutiny of Articles 39 and 42, but also 
 
 
 196. International Committee of the Red Cross, IHL and Other Legal Regimes, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/war/ihl-other-legal-regimies/jus-in-bello-jus-in-bello.htm; BRIAN OREND, 
THE MORALITY OF WAR 33 (2d ed., 2013). 
 197. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 31, art. 2, ¶ 4; see e.g., Stephan Sonnenberg, Why Drones Are 
Different, in PREVENTIVE FORCE: DRONES, TARGETED KILLING, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CONTEMPORARY WARFARE 115, 120 (Kerstin Fisk & Jennifer M. Ramos eds., 2016). 
 198. JOHN NORTON MOORE & ROBERT F. TURNER, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 70 (2005). 
 199. John Norton Moore, Jus Ad Bellum Before the International Court of Justice, 52 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 903, 907–08 (2012). 
 200. Id. at 904. 
 201. Id.; Mirko Bagaric & John R. Morss, Transforming Humanitarian Intervention From an 
Expedient Accident to a Categorical Imperative, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 421, 449 (2005). 
 202. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 31, arts. 39, 42. 
 203. Id. art. 42. 
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consideration of Charter Article 55 which commits the United Nations to, 
among other things, promoting “universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.”204 This commitment is, 
according to the Charter, one of the four overarching purposes of the 
United Nations as an institution—no mean distinction.205 Hence, reading 
the Charter as a whole, as the Vienna Convention counsels, the Security 
Council is invested with the power under Article 42 of Chapter VII to 
deploy armed force for the end of upholding human rights where violation 
of those rights is a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression. 
Since, it will be recalled, mass atrocities are necessarily comprised of 
multiple violent human rights violations, then Security Council 
authorization of armed interventions to stop mass atrocities will usually 
comport with this template.206 
Helpful though the foregoing analysis should be to this Article’s 
agenda, it does not bring us any closer to discovering in jus ad bellum an 
implied peoples’ right to such interventions. As presently construed, the 
Security Council’s power under Charter Article 42 still seems wholly 
discretionary; the provision’s wording imposes no obligation on the 
Council to authorize any armed intervention, even to halt the most 
sickening and massive human rights violations. The unadorned language 
of Article 42 leaves no doubt on this score, delineating forcible measures 
which the Security Council “may take” and the conditions under which 
they may be taken. 
Nevertheless, the plain meaning rule, so sensible and familiar in 
American statutory construction, is not the end of the story when a treaty 
like the Charter is being interpreted. Reverting once more (and with 
apologies for the repetition) to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention,207 
“[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose,” with “context” comprising, in 
addition to the text, a treaty’s preamble and annexes.208 Ergo, Charter 
Article 42 has to be interpreted in keeping with these directives; legally, 
there is no latitude to ignore the Charter’s overall object and purpose, its 
full text, or its preamble, if they have any bearing on Article 42’s 
interpretation. 
 
 
 204. Id. art. 55(c). 
 205. Id. art. 1, ¶ 3. 
 206. Gassama, supra note 1, at 734. 
 207. Vienna Convention, supra note 60, art. 31. 
 208. Id. 
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In this case, the Charter’s object and purpose, text, and preamble209 
have a significant bearing on the meaning of Article 42. As was touched 
upon previously, one of the four stated purposes of the United Nations and 
the Charter is set forth in Article 1, paragraph 3 as “promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights.”210 The centrality of this object to 
the Charter is confirmed by Articles 55 and 56 of the instrument, each of 
which, respectively, commits the United Nations and all member nations 
to furthering human rights.211 The preamble prominently reaffirms the 
commitment as well.212 So, it is both the purpose and object of the Charter 
as well as a legal duty contained within it to champion human rights.  
But, can one extrapolate from the United Nations’ duty to promote 
human rights a Security Council duty to authorize armed interventions to 
stop mass atrocities, i.e., massive human rights abuses? In order to answer 
this key question, there must be taken into account not only the Charter’s 
repeated embrace and extolment of human rights, but also some as yet 
untapped Charter verbiage declaring that, for purposes of implementing 
the Charter’s goals, “armed force shall not be used, save in the common 
interest.”213 Whatever else “the common interest” may be, it must include 
upholding human rights in keeping with Charter Article 1, paragraphs 3 
and 4.214 Not only does paragraph 3 make human rights a primary rationale 
for the United Nations’ existence, but paragraph 4 makes the institution “a 
center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these 
common ends.”215 Linguistically, the phrase “these common ends” 
encompasses paragraph 3’s commitment to human rights and is 
synonymous, or nearly so, with “the common interest” which the preamble 
makes the sine qua non of U.N. authorized armed force. The upshot is that 
if the Security Council authorizes use of armed force pursuant to Article 
42, the Council must adhere to the caveat that the use be for the common 
interest which includes upholding human rights. 
However, the devil is in the detail of that “if.” I employ the preposition 
intentionally to signify that, despite my keenest wishes, the “common 
ends” clause has still not made for a Security Council duty to authorize 
armed humanitarian interventions. What may save the analytical 
progression from becoming a wild goose chase is yet another Charter 
provision—Article 24, paragraphs 1 and 2 which provide: 
 
 
 209. U.N. CHARTER, supra note 31, at preamble. 
 210. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
 211. U.N. Charter, supra note 31, arts. 55, 56. 
 212. Id. at preamble. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. art. 1, ¶¶ 3–4. 
 215. Id. (emphasis added). 
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1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. 
The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the 
discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and 
XII.216 
Reading the two paragraphs together, the Security Council’s Article 42 
power to use force, a Chapter VII power, is for the discharge of Council 
duties; and, since there is a Council duty to maintain international peace 
and security, the Article 42 power may also rise to the level of a Council 
duty where there are no other means of assuring that peace and security. 
217 Put less reductively and considering that stopping mass atrocities is one 
way of maintaining peace and security,218 Articles 24 and 42 arguably 
further impose a duty on the Council to authorize armed force to stop 
calamitous human rights violations including mass atrocities. This 
conclusion becomes virtually unavoidable when Articles 24 and 42 are 
infused with the other Charter provisions discussed above, i.e., the 
Preamble and Articles 1, 55 and 56.219 Finally, from the common maxim 
that duties give rise to rights,220 it should be all but in the stars that under 
jus ad bellum a peoples’ right to U.N. armed intervention to end mass 
atrocities ensues. 
 
 
 216. Id. art. 24, ¶¶ 1–2 (emphasis added). 
 217. See Toope, supra note 119, at 193–94 (seeing U.N. Charter article 24, paragraph 1 as placing 
a duty on the Security Council to maintain peace and security and to prevent genocide); Andreas 
Zimmermann, The Obligation to Prevent Genocide: Towards a General Responsibility to Respect, in 
FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNO SIMMA 629, 
639 (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011) (construing U.N. Charter article 24 as mandating that the 
Security Council must “react . . . in some way” when genocide, crimes against humanity, or war 
crimes have been perpetrated so as to threaten peace); cf. Gassama, supra note 1, at 731–38 
(contending that the Security Council has a duty to authorize armed intervention to stop mass 
atrocities, but without relying on U.N. Charter article 24); Nico Krisch, Legality, Morality and the 
Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 323, 333 (2002) (advocating, 
on moral and philosophical grounds, a Security Council duty with respect to humanitarian 
intervention); Fielding, supra note 1, at 355–56 (looking to U.N. Charter article 24 as a basis for the 
Security Council to provide humanitarian assistance). 
 218. See supra pp. 257-263.  
 219. See supra notes 201-16 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
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D. Reprise 
Three separate juridical bases are laid out above, any one of which 
independently supports recognition of a peoples’ right to U.N. armed 
intervention to stop mass atrocities. Of the three, the analyses founded on 
IHRL and jus in bello are probably the most persuasive, though the jus ad 
bellum basis is viable and should be taken seriously. Each basis’ analytical 
role is the result of straightforward lawyering; methodologically, the 
analyses are truly unremarkable. Moreover, that there are not one, but 
rather multiple sound legal bases should put international lawmakers on 
notice that the proposed peoples’ right has lain dormant for long enough—
a right which we ignore at the peril of atrocities’ future victims and of our 
own consciences. 
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS AT THE UNITED NATIONS TO MAXIMIZE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF A PEOPLES’ RIGHT TO U.N. AUTHORIZED ARMED 
INTERVENTION TO STOP MASS ATROCITIES 
Throughout this Article, a peoples’ right to armed intervention to stop 
mass atrocities has been promoted with the conviction that productive 
enforcement would fare best with new procedures and processes at the 
U.N. I have deferred identifying these mechanisms until policy and legal 
bases for recognition of the right were established. That done, it is now 
appropriate to articulate the mechanisms and investigate how the United 
Nations should be modernized to incorporate them in accommodation of 
the peoples’ right.  
Before proceeding, however, I wish to make perfectly clear that the 
following catalogue of proposed reforms is not meant to suggest the least 
animus towards the U.N. There is no gainsaying its tremendous 
contributions on behalf of peace, security, and human rights,221 and there 
is no comprehending how many people would have been left hobbled in 
their personal lives or cut down altogether without U.N. assistance. These 
facts are not negated by accepting that the U.N. also has made egregious 
mistakes along the way and is crippled by structural weaknesses, the most 
crucial of which allows the domination of big-power politics in the 
Security Council. In acknowledgment of the institution’s importance, 
complexity and paradoxes, this Article therefore adopts an attitude 
towards it of critical but most vigorous support. 
The first mechanism needed to facilitate the proposed right regards 
 
 
 221. See United Nations Seventieth Anniversary, UNITED NATIONS, www.un.org/un70/en/ 
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how actual or soon-to-be victims of mass atrocities would assert the right 
before the U.N. in order to trigger the latter’s attention and decision-
making processes about a particular occurrence of mass atrocity. This 
Article urges that a new class of U.N. special rapporteurs should be 
created for the purpose. As things stand, the U.N. currently has a battery of 
country and thematic rapporteurs whose job, among other things, is to be 
notified of, investigate, monitor, and report on certain human rights 
violations and to pressure the offenders to cease engaging in the illegal 
conduct.222 Each country rapporteur oversees the human rights situation in 
a particular nation while each thematic rapporteur oversees treatment of a 
particular human rights topic around the world.223 There are, to date, over 
40 thematic rapporteurs; none of them have a mandate focused on mass 
atrocities and/or the need for armed intervention to stop the atrocities.224  
The recommended new class of special rapporteurs would be thematic 
special rapporteurs in terms of their geographical reach, i.e., anywhere in 
the world that a problem within the rapporteur’s subject-matter jurisdiction 
manifests.225 Like existing thematic special rapporteurs, who either operate 
singly or in a designated group, these would oversee a distinct human 
rights theme and that theme would be mass atrocities, including procuring 
U.N. action to terminate the atrocities. (For ease of reference going 
forward, mass atrocity special rapporteurs are hereinafter denominated as 
“MASRs.”). For MASRs to be effective, there would need to be enough of 
them so that they could attend to such incipient and full-blown 
catastrophes wherever they materialize, a responsibility which could 
conceivably entail working individually or as a unit of all or some MASRs 
with respect to each occurrence. 
Though I may be the first to suggest that there should be new thematic 
mandates and rapporteurs on mass atrocities, commentators have 
 
 
 222. See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, SPECIAL 
PROCEDURES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages 
/Introduction.aspx (explaining the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council as “independent 
human rights experts with mandates to report and advise on human rights from a thematic or country-
specific perspective”). As of this writing, there are 41 thematic experts, also called “rapporteurs” 
among other titles, each of whom is responsible for a different human rights issue. UNITED NATIONS 
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, THEMATIC MANDATES, 
spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM. 
As of this writing, there are 14 country rapporteurs each of whom oversees the human rights situation, 
whatever the issue, in a particular assigned country. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE 
HIGH COMMISSIONER, spinternet.ohchr.org/_Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewAllCountry 
Mandates.aspx. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
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periodically proposed that the United Nations should appoint additional 
rapporteurs on other themes.226 There is, in fact, nothing aberrant in 
proposing an increase in the numbers of rapporteurs or in human rights 
topics for them to oversee. The U.N. Human Rights Council has done this 
fairly regularly.227 For example, as recently as 2015, the Council 
established three new thematic mandates involving a total of seven 
additional rapporteurs.228 
MASRs ideally would be charged with such responsibilities as: 
receiving information about any relevant occurrences or threats; pro-
actively gathering information about the same on the ground or otherwise; 
where possible, issuing urgent appeals to perpetrators or would-be 
perpetrators that they must immediately refrain from beginning or 
continuing mass atrocities; notifying the U.N. Human Rights Council and 
Security Council of all real occurrences or imminent threats of mass 
atrocity; and, above all, demanding in appropriate cases that the Security 
Council immediately determine whether to authorize armed intervention to 
stop the atrocities from beginning or continuing.229 Of course, the 
definition of “immediately,” as applied to the Security Council decision-
making process under Charter Article 42, would need to be pinned down. 
Security Council members will not be happy about a directive to act with 
speed, but the invariable imperativeness of a quick determination—with 
 
 
 226. See Kevin Boyle & Sigmund Simonsen, Human Security, Human Rights and Disarmament, 
in 3 DISARMAMENT FORUM 5, 13 (Kerstin Vignard ed., 2004) (reiterating proposal “for a separate 
[U.N.] special rapporteur or expert to examine the vital question of military disarmament, human 
rights and lasting peace”); cf. Bertrand Ramcharan, Human Rights and Human Security, in 39 
DISARMAMENT FORUM 39, 45 (2004) (raising whether the United Nations should develop “rapidly 
deployable contingents of . . . observers . . . to trouble spots where the deployment might serve to 
mitigate the excesses of conflict”). 
 227. See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, THEMATIC 
MANDATES, supra note 222 (showing the dates on which the Human Rights Council established new 
thematic mandates); See also Surya P. Subedi, Human Rights Experts in the United Nations: A Review 
of the Role of United Nations Special Procedures, in THE ROLE OF “EXPERTS” IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 241, 245 (Monika Ambrus et al. eds., 2014) (advising that 
“[o]ver time, an increasing number of Special Rapporteurs, Independent Experts and Working Groups 
have been appointed”).  
 228. In 2015, the Human Rights Council established a thematic mandate on people of African 
descent and appointed a five-person working group to monitor it; a thematic mandate on human rights 
of people with albinism, with one rapporteur; and a thematic mandate on the right to privacy, also with 
one new rapporteur. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, 
THEMATIC MANDATES, supra note 222. 
 229. Many of the Mass Atrocities Special Rapporteurs’ (hereinafter MASRs) responsibilities, 
envisioned in the text above, are the same as or similar to the responsibilities already shouldered by 
existing thematic special rapporteurs or experts. See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE 
HIGH COMMISSIONER, SPECIAL PROCEDURES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: INTRODUCTION, 
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lives hanging in the balance—should justify giving less preference to 
diplomatic niceties. 
If instituted as an adjunct to the proposed peoples’ right, MASRs 
would complement, support, and enhance other resources recently put in 
place at the U.N. to combat mass atrocities more effectively.230 For 
example, the organization now has a Special Adviser on the Responsibility 
to Protect and a Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide;231 the two 
jointly head an office tasked with, among other things, alerting other U.N. 
personnel to the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity, and improving U.N. capacity to prevent these 
depredations.232 Although it was hoped that these Special Advisers would 
have superior access to data about actual trouble spots on the ground, 
which, in turn, would allow them to give an early warning to the Security 
Council that a mass atrocity was in the making, the U.N.’s internal rules 
and culture have made the Special Advisers nearly futile in preventing 
atrocities.233 Critics of the arrangement have highlighted that the Special 
Advisers have no right to appear before the Security Council,234 a 
deficiency compounded by the fact that the Council, for its part, has not 
been receptive to hearing from them.235 Moreover, the Special Advisers 
have no mandate to spend time in looming crisis zones so as to unearth 
warning signs of impending mass atrocities;236 nor do the Special Advisers 
even have access to pertinent information collected by other U.N. 
subdivisions which apparently tend to act like jealous fiefdoms when it 
comes to sharing evidence.237  
In an effort to learn from these deficiencies, this Article proposes that 
MASRs should be entitled to appear before the Security Council 
whenever, in the rapporteur’s judgment, it would be advisable for that 
body to authorize armed intervention to stop mass atrocities. And, as was 
intimated previously, MASRs should be under a definite mandate to spend 
 
 
 230. See infra notes 229-35 and accompanying text. 
 231. UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISER ON THE PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, 
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on the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, 5 GENOCIDE STUDIES AND 
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 234. Hehir, Special Adviser, supra note 233, at 270–71. 
 235. HEHIR, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 98–99; Hehir, Special Adviser, supra note 233, at 
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time in the field so as to discover any alarming symptomology.238 Finally, 
like other U.N. Special Rapporteurs, MASRs should be appointed to this 
role only if they possess the requisite expertise and have a stature 
demonstrating their capacity for reliable exercise of judgment informed by 
long experience.239 
This scheme for creating and using MASRs should be a required route, 
though not necessarily the only route, by which people could assert the 
right to U.N. armed intervention to stop mass atrocities; the intent here is 
not to restrict opportunities to assert the right. The MASR set-up would 
have a dual role, on behalf of both the right-holders and the duty-bearer. 
The right-holders, people in the midst of or imminently facing mass 
atrocity, would have the lifeline of MASRs personnel who are especially 
credible on and dedicated to stopping mass atrocities, and who would have 
special access to U.N. decision-making bodies concerning armed 
intervention.240 The duty-bearer, the United Nations, would benefit from 
the MASRs’ informed decision-making in bringing before the Security 
Council only those situations genuinely warranting armed intervention. 
A second reform which should ideally accompany recognition of a 
peoples’ right to U.N. armed intervention to stop mass atrocities, is 
removal of the veto power from each of the Security Council’s five 
permanent members (“P5”) solely in connection with decisions about 
armed intervention to stop mass atrocities.241 It is well known that the veto 
has enabled big-power politics to dictate the direction of numerous 
Council deliberations in the past.242 But, given the P5s’ diverse national 
interests and agendas, the veto power is unlikely to be relinquished 
voluntarily—even respecting just one issue. 
There are political-legal impediments to relinquishment as well. 
Charter Article 27, paragraph 3 requires an affirmative vote of nine 
Security Council members, including the concurring votes of the P5, on all 
non-procedural matters; and, partial abrogation of the veto is 
 
 
 238. See supra notes 227, 231, 234-35 and accompanying text. 
 239. UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, SPECIAL 
PROCEDURES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/ 
Introduction.aspx. 
 240. See supra notes 235-73 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Richard Falk, Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, in HUMAN RIGHTS & CONFLICT: 
EXPLORING THE LINKS BETWEEN RIGHTS, LAW, AND PEACEBUILDING 185, 203–04 (Julie Mertus & 
Jeffrey W. Helsing eds., 2006) (suggesting that the veto held by the P5 should be “restrict[][ed]”); 
Alexander Benard & Paul J. Leaf, Notes, Modern Threats and the United Nations Security Council: 
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 242. See supra notes 19, 86 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
290 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 16:245 
 
 
 
 
unquestionably non-procedural.243 Thus, because the provision demands 
P5 concurrence,244 any abridgement of the veto is a sure nonstarter. Should 
the contraction also necessitate a Charter amendment, a similar difficulty 
would arise inasmuch as article 108 prescribes P5 ratification.245 
Assuming that the veto is here to stay for the foreseeable future, 
another way to counteract its corrupting effects is the inauguration of a 
separate judicial institution within the U.N. system, a court which would 
have jurisdiction strictly limited to ruling upon assertions of the peoples’ 
right to armed intervention to stop mass atrocities whenever the Security 
Council rejects or is deadlocked on authorizing such relief.246 A new U.N. 
court would not be an incongruity. If established, it would coexist with a 
previously established U.N. court, the International Court of Justice 
previously created pursuant to U.N. Charter chapter XIV.247 Helpfully, 
chapter XIV, Article 92 intimates that adding more, as of yet unidentified 
U.N. courts, would be in sync with the Charter’s scheme of things. Article 
92 states, in pertinent part, that “[t]he International Court of Justice shall 
be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.”248 The use of the 
word “principal” implies that other, non-principal judicial bodies may be 
created, and because the second U.N. court would have only single-issue 
jurisdiction (far narrower than that of the ICJ), it could not and would not 
be a “principal” U.N. judicial organ.  
The Charter offers several legal bases for a second U.N. court of this 
kind. Article 7, paragraph 2 provides that “[s]uch subsidiary organs [of the 
U.N.] as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with 
the present Charter,”249 and Article 22 states that “[t]he General Assembly 
may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the 
 
 
 243. U.N. Charter, supra note 31, art. 27, ¶ 3. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. art. 108. 
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performance of its function.”250 Needless to say, the phraseology 
“subsidiary organs” is broad enough to include judicial ones. Under 
Charter Article 18, paragraph 2, General Assembly decisions on 
“important questions” must be made by a two-thirds majority of the 
members present and voting.251 The General Assembly partakes of U.N. 
goals and commitments to human rights, peace, and security,252 making 
the cessation of mass atrocities integral to the Assembly’s mission. So, the 
launching of this new U.N. court would presumably be an important 
question which the Assembly could pass upon.  
It is not feasible within the scope of this Article to lay out the many 
aspects of the new U.N. court’s functioning, but its possible subject matter 
jurisdiction and the triggers for asserting that jurisdiction are so 
interrelated with success that at least some preliminary thoughts on them 
seem desirable at this point. As conceived here, the jurisdiction of the new 
court would be to decide, de novo, colorable assertions of the peoples’ 
right to U.N. armed intervention to stop intrastate mass atrocities.253 For 
purposes of assuring colorability, the claim would have undergone 
preliminarily vetting by one or more of the MASRs, who would also be 
primarily responsible for bringing the case, not only first to the Security 
Council, but then to the new court upon a Council denial or deadlock. Due 
to the singular nature of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the bench 
should be filled by the most highly respected international law experts, 
authoritative military specialists in armed humanitarian intervention, and 
individuals most knowledgeable about providing humanitarian aid.254 A 
 
 
 250. Id. art. 22. 
 251. Id. art. 18, ¶ 2. 
 252. Id. art. 1. 
 253. I make the jurisdiction de novo in order that the new court would have the most complete 
factual basis for reviewing, not only the Security Council’s decision-making rationales and procedures, 
but also the facts on the ground. Furthermore, I would limit the new U.N. court to hearing mass 
atrocity situations occurring intrastate. There are two reasons for this limitation. First, mass atrocity 
situations do not usually occur so as to straddle a national border. Second, the limitation might make 
the establishment of the new court easier to accept if the Security Council retains final say over 
authorizing armed intervention where the atrocities and/or participants in them are from more than one 
country. Cf. HEHIR, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 232 (similarly confining such a court to hearing 
only matters occurring intrastate for the reason that there arguably is “some merit to the idea that the 
Security Council should have exclusive authority to determine how to respond to inter-state crises”). 
 254. In recommending that the composition of the proposed court should include military 
specialists, particularly those knowledgeable about armed humanitarian interventions, I have been 
influenced by U.N. Charter article 47, paragraph 1 which provides as follows: 
There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security 
Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces 
placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament. 
Id. art. 47, ¶ 1. If a “Military Staff Committee” would bring helpful expertise to military-related 
deliberations of the Security Council, then surely military expert judges would bring helpful 
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decision by the court in favor of upholding the right should automatically 
result in authorizing and deploying an armed intervention to stop the mass 
atrocities where they are occurring or imminently about to occur. 
The final reform advanced by this Article concerns provision of 
sufficient troops and materiél essential to efficacious fulfillment of the 
proposed peoples’ right. Charter Article 43 states that “[a]ll Members of 
the United Nations . . . undertake to make available to the Security 
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or 
agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities . . . necessary for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”255 Charter 
Article 45 enunciates that U.N. members “shall hold immediately 
available national air-force contingents for combined international 
enforcement action.”256 Shamefully, history shows that member nations 
with heavyweight militaries have routinely ignored Articles 43 and 45.257 
Their collective blind-eye in this regard has indirectly allowed mass 
atrocities to go unchecked.258 In 1994 Rwanda, for example, if the 
Commander of U.N. Peacekeeping Forces had been provided sufficient 
boots on the ground and equipment, it is plausible that genocidaires would 
not have won the day.259 
The solution to this problem, urged by many commentators, is the 
formation of a U.N. standing army.260 Professor Aidan Hehir, also a 
proponent of erecting a second U.N. court akin to the one proposed here, 
has taken the idea of the standing army a step further by suggesting that it 
should be “at the disposal of the new (judicial) body mandated to 
 
 
specialized knowledge to the new court’s decision-making as well. 
 255. Id. art. 43, ¶ 1. 
 256. Id. art. 45 (emphasis added). 
 257. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEES, UNITED NATIONS LIMITATIONS IN LEADING MISSIONS REQUIRING FORCE TO RESTORE 
PEACE 27 (1997) (stating that “[t]o date, no nation has ever arranged to provide armed forces to the 
United Nations as called for under article 43”); Adam Roberts, Proposals for UN Standing Forces: A 
Critical History, in THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF 
THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945, 107 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008) (observing that thus far 
the United Nations has “lacked the capacity” to deploy “a convincing military presence” at a crisis’ 
commencement). 
 258. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 260. See, e.g., HEHIR, RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 2, at 231–36; Aidan Hehir & A. F. Lang, The 
Impact of the Security Council on the Efficacy of the International Criminal Court and the 
Responsibility to Protect, 26 CRIM. L. F. 153 (2015) (authors’ unpaginated copy); NADÈGE SHEEHAN, 
THE ECONOMICS OF UN PEACEKEEPING 151 (2011); Satya Brata Das, Sustainable Peace, in BUILDING 
SUSTAINABLE PEACE 263, 267 (Tom Keating & W. Andy Knight eds., 2004); see also RONALD M. 
BEHRINGER, THE HUMAN SECURITY AGENDA: HOW MIDDLE POWER LEADERSHIP DEFIED U.S. 
HEGEMONY 48–49 (2012) (relating that, in a 1992 speech, President Ronald Reagan called for the 
creation of a UN standing army). 
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undertake coercive action should states [under U.N. aegis] be unwilling to 
deploy their troops.”261 Hehir proffered, as a selling point, that the number 
of instances where the new court would deploy such a military force 
would be “very small” given the court’s limited jurisdictional triggers.262 
But, even if the force was used more than a very small number of times, so 
be it; very large numbers of lives are at stake. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Legal scholarship is sparse, timid and vacillating concerning 
recognition of a peoples’ right to U.N. armed intervention to stop mass 
atrocities. There is no reason why things must be this way. The academy 
and the bar can and should be meditating often and robustly about the 
possibility of such a right. 
It is hard to understand what principled considerations have inhibited 
the discussion from taking place. In light of human rights values, it makes 
eminent good sense to empower those most immediately imperiled—the 
actual and potential victims of mass atrocities. Endowing people with the 
legal personhood which enables them to save themselves and their loved 
ones via U.N. armed force—and thereby to turn their victimhood into 
victory—is but to actualize human life and dignity in the most elemental 
way. These are the core values at the heart of human rights law and its 
reason for being.263 
Whatever the cause for the legal profession’s tacit disapproval or 
disinterest, it is prompted by a more clinical wisdom than I can muster. In 
this, I claim no moral high ground, but rather take a page from Virgil who 
optimistically proclaimed “audentes fortuna juvat”: fortune helps the 
daring.264 Would that this Article, a little bit of juristic derring-do, may 
contribute to eliciting fortune’s help, armed and committed in the U.N.’s 
name to rescuing mass atrocities’ next terrified victims. 
 
 
 261. Hehir & Lang, supra note 260 (authors’ unpaginated copy). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Protection of human life is set forth in multiple human rights instruments. E.g., ICCPR, supra 
note 73, art. 6, ¶ 1; European Convention supra note 74, art. 2, ¶ 1; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. Protection 
of human dignity is also set forth in major human rights instruments. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 73, 
at preamble, art. 10, ¶ 1 (guaranteeing that persons deprived of their liberty must be treated “with 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”); African [Banju] Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, supra note 153, art. 5; UDHR, art. 1. 
 264. I have never read Virgil. I got the quote from another law review article: Sohn, supra note 
93, at 63–64 (1982). It was an irresistible note upon which to end an Article like this one. 
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